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Abstract
Turf wars in organizations commonly occur in environments where competition under-
mines collaboration. We develop a game theoretic model and experimental test of turf
wars. The model explores how team production incentives ex post affect team formation
decisions ex ante. In the game, one agent decides whether to share jurisdiction over a
project with other agents. Agents with jurisdiction decide whether to exert effort and
receive a reward based on their relative performance. Hence, sharing can increase joint
production but introduces competition for the reward. We find that collaboration has
a non-monotonic relationship with both productivity and rewards. The laboratory ex-
periment confirms the model’s main predictions. We also explore extensions of the basic
model, including one where each agent’s productivity is private information.
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1 Introduction
The “turf war” is one the most commonly recognized organizational pathologies. When in-
formally discussing turf wars with people with work experience, anecdotal accounts abound.
While there is no consensus on the definition of the term, accounts of the phenomenon typically
possess common elements. Agents, such as government bureau heads or corporate division
managers, perceive themselves to be in competition with one another over resources, promo-
tions, or publicity.1 This friction hampers efficient team formation: given the opportunity
to pursue an important task or assignment, these agents will then attempt to exclude rivals
from participation. Tactics might include withholding crucial information, or using decision-
making rights to shunt rivals’ activities into low-profile tasks. Importantly, principals or other
external actors may want agents to collaborate, but they do not always have the ability to
enforce such behavior.
Unsurprisingly, turf battles are widely believed to have significant adverse effects on orga-
nizational performance. In his classic analysis of bureaucratic politics, Wilson (2000) devoted
an entire chapter to describing the consequences of turf-motivated strategies. Moreover, ex-
amples involving some of the largest organizations and most significant pieces of legislation
are not difficult to find. The following list illustrates four major instances of turf wars. All
suggest persistent inefficient allocations of property rights that were ultimately addressed
through external interventions typically enabled by exogenous events.
U.S. Military Branches. The National Security Act of 1947 established the basic structure
of the modern U.S. national security bureaucracy. The law preserved the relative autonomy of
the individual armed services, which led to competition and low levels of coordination between
functionally similar units. In the Korean and Vietnam wars, the Navy and Air Force ran
essentially independent air campaigns, and subsequent operations in Lebanon and Grenada in
the early 1980s were marred by the services’ inability to communicate. As Lederman (1999)
documents, this performance record culminated in the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. The
reforms included the creation of Unified Combat Commands, which allowed local commanders
to coordinate centrally the activities of all American forces operating in a given region.
1An alternative view, offered by Garicano and Posner (2005), is that turf wars are a form of influence
activities (Milgrom and Roberts 1988).
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U.S. Intelligence Reform. In its comprehensive analysis of the 9/11 attacks, the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks (2004) prominently criticized the organization of U.S. intel-
ligence gathering. The report—commonly known as the 9/11 Commission Report—argued
that the 14 competing intelligence agencies spread across several federal departments hin-
dered the aggregation of information relevant to the disruption of attacks. It recommended
the creation of a central office to coordinate intelligence gathering activities across these agen-
cies. The position of Director of National Intelligence was officially created by the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
Pepsico’s restaurants. While it was the owner of Pizza Hut, Taco Bell, and KFC, Pepsico
operated the restaurant chains as autonomous divisions that competed with each other and
reported directly to the CEO (Dahlstrom et al. 2004). As a result, managers worked indepen-
dently and rarely communicated with each other because they feared they would give away
trade secrets. The restaurant chains often failed to coordinate their purchasing, headquar-
ter tasks, data management, and real estate functions, effectively relinquishing an estimated
$100 million per year in cost savings (Montgomery 2001). Some of these issues were subse-
quently addressed when the restaurant chains were spun off to form Tricon Global Restaurants,
which allowed the creation of common procurement and information management divisions
(Dahlstrom et al. 2004).
Drug Enforcement. Wilson (1978) discusses the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency’s (DEA)
geographical drug enforcement program, which was used to allocate “buy money” for drug
investigations. The money was allocated competitively across DEA regions on the basis of
previous arrests, with more significant arrests earning larger rewards. This, however, resulted
in perverse sharing incentives:
“Many drug distribution networks cut across regional lines. One organization may bring
brown heroin from Mexico in to Detroit, where it is cut and then sent on to Boston or New
York to be sold on the street. Six DEA regions have an interest in this case . . . If agent
and regional directors believe they are rewarded for their stats, they will have an incentive
to keep leads and informants to themselves in order to take credit for a Mexican heroin
case should it develop. A more appropriate strategy would be for such information to be
shared so that an interregional case can be made . . . The perceived evaluation and reward
system of the organization . . . threatens to lessen the credit, and therefore (it is believed)
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the resources, available for a given region.”
The geographical drug enforcement program induced a bias toward capturing street-level of-
fenders, even though most agents and outsiders would have preferred higher profile cases.2
The DEA responded to these sharing issues by creating investigation-specific inter-regional
task forces. However, these task forces often only displaced the turf issue, as regional of-
fices were reluctant to share their best agents and the assignment of credit for a successful
investigation could be difficult.
These examples illustrate that there exist many instances in which cooperation among
competing agencies is hard to achieve, in spite of repeated interactions, and where ex ante
transfers that implement the efficient allocation of resources are unavailable.3
This paper develops a model of organizational turf wars. It is, to our knowledge, the first
model to consider how turf wars in organizations arise, and how they might be controlled. As
Posner (2005) notes, “The literature on turf wars is surprisingly limited, given their frequency
and importance” (p. 143). Accordingly, the model is simple and attempts to capture only the
essential elements of a turf battle. We view these elements to be the following.
Joint production. Perhaps most obviously, questions about responsibility over a task can
only arise between agents who are capable of contributing to the joint production of relevant
outcomes.
Property rights. Agents have property rights over their jurisdiction. In other words, agents
can choose whether they want to involve other agents in the production process they control
or exclude them to protect their turf.4
2Wilson (1978) mentions variations of this behavior at several levels in the investigation and prosecution of
drug law violators: e.g., by U.S. Attorneys, local police agencies, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
3Even within academia, activities such as co-authorships have a similar incentive structure to the DEA
example above. When deciding whether to invite a second author into a promising new research idea or
project, the first author faces a clear trade-off. While co-authorship with a more skilled second author is likely
to increase significantly the quality of an article, it is also likely to lessen the individual credit and perhaps the
promotion chances of the first author. This problem is most prominent in disciplines where the formation of
research teams is a first order problem, such as medicine and biology.
4An important assumption of our model is that an external actor such as a legislature cannot simply
force agents to share jurisdiction, which trivializes the problem. The motivating logic behind centralizing
re-organizations such as those proposed by the 9/11 Commission Report is that agents would be more easily
induced to share if they were placed under one roof. While this approach has no doubt had its successes, such
3
Competition. Agents must be in competition. The competition might be over an explicit
prize, for example a promotion in a rank-order tournament, or it may reflect the ability to
undermine the production of other agents. The intensity of the competition might emerge
from basic indivisibilities of prizes that are only awardable to a single “winner.” Examples
include gaining favorable media attention, or securing a prestigious project assignment.5
Our basic model considers two agents who can exert effort in order to contribute to a
collective project. One agent, labeled the originator, begins the game by choosing the set of
agents who will have jurisdiction over the project.6 She may keep jurisdiction, which prevents
the partner agent from working, she may refer jurisdiction, thus giving the partner exclusive
authority, or she may share jurisdiction, allowing both agents to work on the project. Agents
care about the project’s overall output and an indivisible prize that is increasing in their joint
production. Each agent’s productivity is common knowledge, and the probability of winning
the prize is increasing in each agent’s relative contribution to the project. Sharing jurisdiction
increases the project’s overall output but reduces the originator’s probability of receiving the
prize. A turf war then occurs when the originator keeps jurisdiction when sharing would have
been socially desirable.
The most important predictions of the model concern the conditions that generate collaboration—
the outcome where the originator shares and both agents work. As intuition would suggest,
agents work when their productivity and the size of the prize are sufficiently high. Moreover,
when both agents have the opportunity to work, they have a higher incentive to free-ride. The
incentives to share their jurisdiction are more complex. Increasing the prize has two main
effects. At low levels, it increases the originator’s incentive to share through the inducement
of work by the partner. However, at very high levels, it can reduce her incentive to share
reforms have not been uniformly successful. One reason for this is that competition may be more pronounced
within organizations than between them (e.g., Posner 2005). In the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, for
example, the two main branches (operations and analytics) are historically fierce rivals (Gates 1987). Thus,
we focus on the determinants of turf wars in environments where collaboration is plausibly non-contractible.
5This assumption is considered natural in the bureaucratic setting. For example, Downs (1966) argued that
bureaucracies were in a constant state of competition, and in particular that “No bureau can survive unless it
is continually able to demonstrate that its services are worthwhile to some group with influence over sufficient
resources to keep it alive.”
6Originator status may arise from technology or statutory assignments of responsibility, or from a principal’s
inability to re-assign property rights.
4
and induce a turf war. Thus, collaboration benefits from increasing the competitive prize in
some instances and decreasing it in others. Somewhat surprisingly, the effect of increasing
originator productivity can therefore be non-monotonic. This occurs because both the least
and most productive originators always share when the partner is willing to work, but inter-
mediate types may not.7 In some cases, increasing the originator’s productivity from a low
level can actually reduce overall output.
We test the predictions of the model with a laboratory experiment. This exercise is espe-
cially relevant for our topic because turf wars are difficult to observe directly in the field.8 In
particular, lack of sharing and collaboration might be hard to observe and the incentives to do
so might be hard to quantify, which makes a direct test of the model difficult to perform. The
experiment focuses on some of the more interesting implications of our model. Namely, the
potential non-monotonic effect of the competitive prize on sharing and joint production. Our
results provide strong support for the predicted behavior of the model. We find that increas-
ing the prize initially increases production as it provides an incentive to both agents to exert
effort. Further increases, however, clearly result in suboptimal jurisdiction decisions and a
considerable reduction in joint production when the originator is of intermediate productivity.
Our basic setup, despite its simplicity, is sufficient to obtain our core results. However, we
also develop three extensions to the basic model in order to explore the robustness of its results.
The first considers a constant prize rather than one that increases in joint production. The
second examines the substitutability or complementarity of agents’ efforts and allows for more
than two agents. The final extension introduces incomplete information about both agents’
productivity levels. By and large, the predictions from the three extensions are consistent
with the basic model in that the most productive originators share when there are production
synergies and increasing the prize can have a non-monotonic effect on overall output.
While there are no other formal models and only a few empirical attempts that explicitly
7Generally, the most productive originators share and work while the least productive ones tend to share
and shirk. We also find that if agents are motivated more by joint output than by the prize of winning, a
subset of originators with relatively low productivity will also share and work.
8The most salient empirical analyses of turf wars study how political institutions acquire new responsibil-
ities. King (1994, 1997) analyze the evolution of the division of labor across U.S. Congressional committees.
Consistent with our model, Wilson (2000) argues that bureaucracies’ preferences over new jurisdiction are
shaped in large part by their competitive environment.
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address the idea of turf wars in organizations,9 this paper is related to work on tournaments,
sabotage, information sharing, and referrals.
The fact that agents who share jurisdiction compete for an indivisible prize that is awarded
according to relative performance implies that our model is related to the literature on rank-
order tournaments (Lazear and Rosen 1981). This line of research describes the relationship
between effort and competition among individuals (e.g., Schotter and Weigelt 1992; Bull
et al. 1987) as well as among groups (e.g., Nalbantian and Schotter 1997; Tan and Bolle 2007;
Markussen et al. 2014).10 We contribute to this literature by adding an initial sharing stage
in which the originator effectively decides whether she wants to compete in a tournament
with the partner agent. This allows us to study the conditions under which tournaments
that would otherwise increase effort, result instead in lack of sharing between agents and low
output.
A subset of the literature on rank-order tournaments that is important in relation to
our model is that of sabotage (e.g., Lazear 1989; Konrad 2000; Chen 2003; Falk et al. 2008;
Harbring and Irlenbusch 2005, 2011; Balafoutas et al. 2012). Although we do not model it
here, sabotage might be one way in which turf battles are fought, especially when agents
are brought together involuntarily. These models focus on inefficiencies that arise because
competition gives agents in a given team an incentive to sabotage each other’s output. By
contrast, in our model, competition can result in inefficiencies due to jurisdictional tools
available to the originator that allow her to choose the composition of the team. A distinctive
feature of our model compared to the literature on sabotage is that because of the benefits of
joint production, more intense competition does not necessarily lead to welfare losses.
A second related literature is that on information sharing. Like sabotage, the failure to
reveal information relevant to collective outcomes might be considered a failure of collabo-
ration. A central question in this work is the extent to which players reveal their private
information, even when they are in competition. Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) develop a
9A 2016 JSTOR article search of the term “turf war” in economics, political science, and management yields
7 title hits and 8 abstract hits, none of which are associated with a formal model of organizations.
10For recent reviews of the theoretical and experimental literatures see Connelly et al. (2014) and Sheremeta
(2015), respectively. There is also a large literature on the rent-seeking model of Tullock (1980), which models
the exertion of effort in order to win a fixed price as wasteful (for a review of this literature see Congleton
et al. 2008; Dechenaux et al. 2015).
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two-stage model in which players first decide non-cooperatively whether to make a verifiable
report of their information, and derive conditions for full revelation.11 Other models have
developed this idea in more specific strategic contexts. Stein (2008) models two competitors
who have complementary ideas in alternating periods. Each player is willing to reveal her
idea to the competitor if she uses it to form a better idea that will be passed back in turn.
High levels of complementarity and skill sustain information sharing in equilibrium.
Finally, our model is related to that of Garicano and Santos (2004), who study the market
for referrals of tasks between agents under incomplete information (see also, Landini et al.
2013). Like us, they model a situation where inefficiencies arise due to agents failing to share
jurisdiction over tasks. However, their paper focuses on institutional solutions to matching
problems, rather than on the possibilities for joint production.
2 The model
In this section, we describe the game theoretic model and the main theoretical results. This
core setup resembles that of Garicano and Santos (2004) but crucially also features collabo-
ration (or lack thereof) between agents in a single project, which is the central focus of our
analysis. There are two agents, labeled A1 and A2. One agent (without loss of generality, A1)
has initial jurisdiction over a task. We label A1 the originator. The originator’s key decision
is to what extent to share jurisdiction with A2.
Each agent i generates an output level xi ∈ {0, θi} for the task when she has jurisdiction
over it. When Ai does not have jurisdiction, her output is xi = 0. The parameter θi ∈ [0, 1]
represents i’s productivity and is common knowledge. Ai’s output level is given simply by
eiθi, where ei ∈ {0, 1} is i’s effort level. We assume that the effort costs of agent Ai are eik.
We denote by x = x1 + x2 the total output of the agents.
Agents receive utility from two sources. First, they value aggregate output, with Ai
receivingmx, wherem > 0. This represents a kind of “policy” motivation or the share received
by an agent according to a revenue-sharing incentive scheme. Second, they compete for a prize
11A few papers on information sharing in oligopoly competition also consider the question of whether com-
petitors share information in settings where they can commit to doing so prior to its revelation (e.g., Gal-Or
1985; Creane 1995; Raith 1996). See also Modica (2010), who shows how competing firms might contribute
to open source projects, and Baccara and Razin (2007), who develop a bargaining model in which innovators
share ideas in order to develop them but worry that by doing so their ideas could be stolen.
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of value βx, where β > 0 and k ∈ (0,m + β). The upper bound on k ensures that exerting
effort is undominated. The prize might represent a form of credit for superior performance,
such as a promotion, a bonus, or public recognition. When only Ai has jurisdiction, she
wins the prize with certainty. When both agents have jurisdiction, the probability of victory
depends on relative outputs and a random noise term. A1 then wins when x1 > x2 + ε, where
ε ∼ U [−1, 1]. Hence, Ai’s probability of victory is easily calculated as:12
ωi(xi, x−i) =
xi − x−i + 1
2
. (1)
Putting all of the elements together, Ai receives the following utility:
ui =

m (x1 + x2) + β (x1 + x2)ωi − eik if both have jurisdiction
mxi + βxi − eik if only Ai has jurisdiction
mx−i if only A−i has jurisdiction.
(2)
The game begins with A1 choosing s ∈ {share, keep, refer}. Under “share,” both agents
have jurisdiction. Under “keep,” only A1 has jurisdiction, while under “refer,” A1 passes
jurisdiction to A2. After the assignment of jurisdiction, the agents with jurisdiction choose
effort ei ∈ {0, 1}. This choice is simultaneous when both agents have jurisdiction. We derive
the subgame perfect equilibrium.
2.1 Equilibrium
We begin with the effort choice. Consider first the subgame following A1’s choice to share.
The best responses are easy to derive. Ai works, i.e. exerts effort, when her partner works
if m(θ1 + θ2) + β(θ1 + θ2)ωi(θi, θ−i) − k ≥ mθ−i + βθ−i ωi(0, θ−i), and she works when her
partner does not work if mθi + βθi ωi(θi, 0) − k ≥ 0. Both expressions result in the same
threshold:
θi ≥ θH ≡
−
(
m+ β2
)
+
√(
m+ β2
)2
+ 2βk
β
. (3)
12We follow the convention in the rank-order tournament literature and determine the winner using dif-
ferences in output and random noise, which can be interpreted as the result of output not being perfectly
observable (Lazear and Rosen 1981). An alternative would be to follow the rent-seeking literature and use
a contest success function based on relative output differences: ωi(xi, x−i) =
xdi
xdi+x
d
−i
. The rent-seeking ap-
proach is equivalent to a rank-order tournament if production functions are linear and noise is exponentially
distributed (Loury 1979).
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This threshold is strictly positive and decreasing in m. Thus, Ai has a weakly dominant
strategy to work when θi ≥ θH . Note that with a non-uniform distribution, agents may not
have a dominant strategy, but the incentive to work would still be increasing in θi.
Next, consider the subgame in which only one agent has jurisdiction. This happens to
A2 when A1 refers, as well as to A1 when she keeps jurisdiction. Ai works when alone if
(m+ β)θi − k > 0, and not otherwise, namely if:
θi ≥ θL ≡ k
m+ β
(4)
The following lemma establishes the relationship between the two thresholds. We provide
all the paper’s proofs in the appendix.
Lemma 1 Second stage effort thresholds.
k = 0 ⇐⇒ θL = θH = 0
k ∈ (0,m+ β) ⇐⇒ 0 < θL < θH < 1
k = m+ β ⇐⇒ θL = θH = 1.
Thus we have three disjoint regions that characterize effort as a function of productivity.
The least able agents, with productivity θi ∈ (0, θL), always choose e∗i = 0. The most able
agents, with productivity θi ∈ (θH , 1), always choose e∗i = 1. Finally, agents with intermediate
productivity θi ∈ (θL, θH) choose e∗i = 1 only if they alone have jurisdiction, otherwise they
choose e∗i = 0. As intuition would suggest, each agent’s incentive to work is increasing in her
productivity. She is also more inclined to work when she has sole jurisdiction as opposed to
shared jurisdiction, since the latter entails a positive probability of losing β even when the
partner exerts no effort.
Moving to the first stage sharing choice, it is convenient to use the labels listed in Table 1
to refer to the different jurisdiction-effort profiles in the game. Observe that A1 would never
share if A2 would not work, and so we ignore this combination. In addition, the outcome
where A1 keeps jurisdiction and exerts effort is labeled as autarchy if it is efficient in terms
of total welfare and as a turf war if it is inefficient.
There are three cases corresponding to the region containing θ2. First, when θ2 ∈ (0, θL),
A1 anticipates no effort from A2. A1’s decision then depends only on whether she herself will
work. If θ1 < θ
L, the result is indifference, while if θ1 > θ
L, A1 does strictly better by keeping
and the result is autarchy.
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Table 1. Jurisdiction-effort profiles
Label Jurisdiction Effort
Indifference any none
Autarchy/Turf war A1 A1
Referral A2 A2
Delegation A1, A2 A2
Collaboration A1, A2 A1, A2
Second, when θ2 ∈ (θL, θH), sharing results in no effort by A2. Thus, A1 keeps if she
prefers to work and refers if she prefers that A2 works alone. A1 prefers refer to keep if:
θ1 >
mθ2 + k
m+ β
. (5)
As with the case for θ2 ∈ (0, θL), higher values of θ1 are associated with autarchy. But
now with a stronger A2, a weaker A1 has a strict preference for a referral. The threshold (5)
is obviously strictly greater than θL, since an originator who never works would clearly prefer
referral to autarchy. This implies that the range of θ1 values that generate autarchy is strictly
smaller as A2 moves from low to moderate productivity.
The third and most complex case is when θ2 > θ
H . The experiment in Section 3 focuses
on this case. It is clear that referrals and indifference are not possible in this setting. Since A2
is guaranteed to work, both outcomes are dominated by the delegation outcome. Moreover,
not giving jurisdiction to A2 is inefficient in terms of total welfare. Hence, A1’s choice boils
down to a decision over turf war, delegation, and collaboration.
It will be useful to introduce three new parameters that give the values of θ1 at which A1
is indifferent between share and keep. First, when θ1 > θ
H , so that both agents are expected
to work if they have jurisdiction, A1 is indifferent between collaboration and turf war at the
following values of θ1:
θ± ≡ 1
2
±
√
1
4
− θ2
(
2m
β
+ 1− θ2
)
(6)
When θ+ and θ− are not real-valued, A1 always prefers collaboration to autarchy. Next, when
θ1 ∈ (θL, θH), A1 is indifferent between delegation and autarchy at the following value of θ1:
θ˜ ≡ mθ2 +
1
2βθ2 (1− θ2) + k
m+ β
. (7)
The next result summarizes outcomes for all combinations of θ1 and θ2. The main finding
when θ2 > θ
H is that a turf war can occur for “moderate” values of θ1. The originator chooses
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to keep jurisdiction because sharing would greatly reduce her chances of receiving the prize
to a high-ability partner. By contrast, when the originator’s productivity is low enough to
make her either unwilling to exert effort or unlikely to win, the result is delegation. Finally,
when the originator’s productivity level guarantees a sufficiently high probability of winning
the prize, the result is collaboration.
Proposition 1 (Outcomes)
(i) If θ2 ∈ (0, θL) then
 indifference if θ1 < θLautarchy if θ1 > θL.
(ii) If θ2 ∈ (θL, θH) then
 referral if θ1 <
mθ2+k
m+β
autarchy if θ1 >
mθ2+k
m+β .
(iii) If θ2 ∈ (θH , 1) and θH < θ˜ then
when θ− and θ+ are not
real-valued or θ+ < θH
 delegation if θ1 ∈ (0, θH)collaboration if θ1 ∈ (θH , 1),
and when θ− and θ+ are
real-valued and θ+ > θH

delegation if θ1 ∈ (0, θH)
collaboration if θ1 ∈ (θH , θ−)
turf war if θ1 ∈ (max{θH , θ−}, θ+)
collaboration if θ1 ∈ (θ+, 1),
where (θH , θ−) is possibly empty.
Else if θ2 ∈ (θH , 1) and
θH > θ˜ then

delegation if θ1 ∈ (0, θ˜)
turf war if θ1 ∈ (θ˜,max{θH , θ+})
collaboration if θ1 ∈ (max{θH , θ+}, 1).
For high values of θ2, there are three possible patterns of outcomes as θ1 increases from 0
to 1: delegation → collaboration, delegation → turf war → collaboration, and delegation →
collaboration→ turf war→ collaboration. The final pattern may appear somewhat anomalous
because the “collaboration region” is non-convex. The intuition for this is that the condition
θ˜ < θH holds when θ2 and m are relatively high. An originator with a relatively low θ1 will
then collaborate because she cares about output and would be unable to contribute enough
to collective output in a turf war.
Two general patterns emerge from this equilibrium. First, only high types are willing to
work. Second, conditional upon A2 being willing to work, high-productivity and possibly
11
Delegation
Collaboration
Turf war
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
θ1
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 β
Figure 1. Outcomes as a function of β and θ1
Note: Here 2m + β = 1, k = 0.15, and θ2 = 0.95, which ensures that A2 always works
when given jurisdiction. Delegation maximizes welfare for θ1 < 0.15, while collaboration
maximizes welfare for θ1 > 0.15.
low-productivity originators share. Only intermediate-productivity originators do not share,
and so sharing and working may be non-monotonic in originator type.
2.2 Comparative statics and welfare
For the next result as well as the subsequent experiment, we will focus on the effect of
competition (β). To distinguish between the effects of increasing competition and increasing
the size of the “pie,” we keep the size of the total reward constant by fixing 2m+ β = W for
some W > 0.
Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium outcomes as a function of β and θ1 for a set of pa-
rameters satisfying θ2 > θ
H and W = 1. For β ∈ (0, 0.83), θH < θ˜ and the outcome pattern
is delegation → collaboration. For β ∈ (0.83, 0.87), the delegation → collaboration → turf
war → collaboration pattern appears. Finally for higher values of β, θH > θ˜ and the pattern
becomes delegation → turf war → collaboration.
The figure also helps to clarify the welfare implications of the game. The agents’ joint
welfare increases by (2m + β)θi − k if agent Ai works. Thus if this quantity is positive for
both agents, then collaboration maximizes welfare. Under the parametric assumptions from
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Figure 1, collaboration is efficient whenever θ1 > 0.15, and referral or delegation is efficient
otherwise. The equilibrium is therefore inefficient when a turf war occurs, but also when
delegation occurs for θ1 > 0.15. Inefficiencies are therefore possible across all values of β
when θ1 is “moderate,” but somewhat counterintuitively, the range of values for which such
inefficiencies occur is not minimized when β is smallest. Rather, moderate values of β come
“closest” to producing efficient outcomes.
Proposition 2 generalizes this figure and presents some basic comparative statics on the
most important outcome regions.
Proposition 2 (Comparative Statics)
The set of θ1 values for which a turf war occurs is increasing in β and weakly decreasing in
k. The set of θ1 values for which delegation occurs is decreasing in β and increasing in k.
Specifically, for θ2 ∈ (θH , 1), if θH < θ˜ then comparative statics are:
Region Outcome β k
(0, θH) delegation decreases increases
(θH , θ−) collaboration ambiguous decreases
(θ−, θ+) turf war increases constant
(θ+, 1) collaboration decreases constant
And if θH > θ˜, then comparative statics are:
Region Outcome β k
(0, θ˜) delegation decreases increases
(θ˜, θ+) turf war increases decreases
(θ+, 1) collaboration decreases constant
Proposition 2 shows that the observation about the effect of β on outcomes from Figure 1
is general. Since θH is decreasing in β, the reduction in delegation implies an expansion
in the collaboration region when there is no turf war region, i.e., in the first expression in
Proposition 1(iii). Thus when both agents have jurisdiction, increasing the prize induces
efficient outcomes for a wider range of θ1. While the well-known effort inducing effect of the
prize is always underlying, a turf war emerges for a large enough prize. As a prescription, a
principal would therefore want to increase β (at the expense of m) up to the point where turf
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wars become possible. For values of β that generate a turf war, increasing β has the opposite
effect of reducing the region where efficient outcomes can occur.
We finally make two observations about the role played by effort costs in this model.
First, unlike β and m, increasing k never encourages collaboration. However, when θH > θ˜
and θ2 ∈
(
θH , 1
)
(so that A2 always works) increasing k has no effect. Second, in the special
case of costless effort, collaboration is non-monotonic. It is easily verified that k = 0 implies
θH = θL = 0, so both agents always work. It follows that the outcomes of indifference,
referral, and delegation cannot occur in equilibrium. The equilibrium is characterized by
Proposition 1(iii), where θH < θ˜. Collaboration therefore occurs for both low and high
productivity originators, with a turf war resulting for intermediate productivities. Intuitively,
very able originators collaborate as they are not threatened by potentially sharing some of
their prize/credit, while low skilled originators collaborate despite the likely loss of the prize
as they would not be able to produce a valuable-enough project alone. Moderate ability
originators are the competitive types that generate inefficiencies.
3 Experimental design
In this section we present the results from a laboratory experiment used to test the more no-
table implications of our model. In particular, we examine the nonlinear effect of competition
(β) on production and welfare. As with the comparative statics in Section 2.2, we focus on
the case where the total reward is constant and is given by W = 2m+ β. In other words, we
compare situations that differ only in the importance of the incentive to compete as a fraction
of the total compensation.
In the experiment, subjects were grouped in pairs. In each pair, one subject played the
role of A1 (the originator) and the other played the role of A2. As in our model, A1 first
decided between keeping, referring, or sharing. Subsequently, A1 and/or A2 chose between
exerting effort or not. The subjects’ monetary payoffs were based on equation (2) and were
calculated in points. However, instead of implementing ωi(x1, x2) as i’s probability of winning
the whole prize, we implemented ωi(x1, x2) as i’s share of the total prize. This change has the
advantage that it simplifies the game and limits the effects of risk aversion (we assume agents
are risk neutral in our model).13 In all our treatments, we set k = 220 points and W = 380
13Experimental evidence comparing winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests finds that the former
14
points. Since the detrimental effects of competition occur when A2’s productivity is high
(see Proposition 1), we set θ2 = 0.95 throughout. The parameters that we varied were A1’s
productivity, which could take values θ1 ∈ {0.55, 0.75, 0.95}, and the size of the prize, which
could equal β ∈ {57, 190, 304, 361} points (these values of β imply m ∈ {161.5, 95, 38, 9.5}
points respectively). To facilitate the interpretation of our results, from now on, we normalize
W , k, β, and m such that W = 1. This way, β ∈ {0.15, 0.50, 0.80, 0.95} is simply the fraction
of the total reward that is due to the competitive prize. The three values of θ1 and the four
values of β give us twelve treatments, each corresponding to a parameter combination. We
refer to each treatment by these two values (e.g., treatment θ95β15 corresponds to the case
where θ1 = 0.95 and β = 0.15).
In the experiment, subjects played 60 periods (repetitions) of the game. Given the com-
plexity of the game, we had subjects play multiple periods to give them the opportunity to
learn. However, in order to approximate play in a one-shot game, subjects were informed
that they would be randomly rematched at the beginning of each period with another subject
in the room and that they would not be able to identify other subjects (there were sixteen
subjects per session). We rematched subjects within a matching group of eight, which has
been shown to be sufficiently large to eliminate repeated-game effects (e.g., see Camera and
Casari 2009). In addition, subjects knew that they would be paid the outcome of only one
period, which would be randomly selected at the end of the experiment (the same period was
paid for all subjects in a session). At the end of each period, subjects were informed of the
outcome of the game and their earnings in that period.
Subjects were randomly assigned to the role of A1 or A2 at the beginning of each period.
Subjects knew that the productivity of A2 would always be θ2 = 0.95 and that the productivity
of A1 would be randomly determined every period among the values θ1 ∈ {0.55, 0.75, 0.95}.
Each session was divided into four parts of 15 periods each. The payoffs in each part were
based on one value of β ∈ {0.15, 0.50, 0.80, 0.95}. In the instructions, subjects were told that
the payoffs of the game would change during the experiment and that they would be informed
of the change when it occurred. At the beginning of each part (i.e., in periods 1, 16, 31, and
46), subjects were shown the payoffs implied by the respective β and were given as much time
as they wanted to evaluate the change. In order to control for order effects, each session was
results in higher effort and lower efficiency than the latter(Cason et al. 2010). In our experiment, this difference
ought to play less of a role as effort cannot be high-enough to reduce efficiency.
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Figure 2. Predicted outcome as a function of θ1 and β
Note: Predicted equilibrium outcomes according to Proposition 1 for θ1 ∈ (0, 1), β ∈ (0, 1),
W = 1, θ2 = 0.95, and k = 0.58. The twelve treatments implemented in the experiment are
shown at their corresponding values of θ1 and β.
run using a different sequence of βs. We ran one session for each of the 24 possible sequences.
We ran the experiment in the CELSS laboratory of Columbia University in the fall of
2013. Subjects were recruited with an online recruitment system (Greiner 2004) and the
computerized experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). We used standard
experimental procedures, including random assignment of subjects to roles and treatments,
anonymity, neutrally worded instructions, dividers between the subjects’ cubicles, and mon-
etary incentives. A sample of the instructions is available in the appendix. In total, 192
subjects participated in the 90-minute long experiment. Each subject took part in only one
session. Total compensation, including a $5 show-up fee, varied between $9 and $33.30 and
averaged $23.32.
3.1 Predictions
Figure 2 depicts the predicted equilibrium outcome for all values of θ1 and β given the other
parameters in the experiment (i.e., for W = 1, θ2 = 0.95, and k = 0.58). The figure also
shows the twelve treatments implemented in the experiment. These parameter combinations
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Table 2. Predicted differences in behavior depending on Proposition 1
Agent Action Predicted treatment comparisons
A1
Keep Delegation = Collaboration < Turf war
Refer Delegation = Collaboration = Turf war
Share Turf war < Delegation = Collaboration
Effort (after keep) Indifference = Delegation < Collaboration = Turf war
Effort (after share) Indifference = Delegation < Collaboration = Turf war
A2
Effort (after refer) Indifference < Delegation = Collaboration = Turf war
Effort (after share) Indifference < Delegation = Collaboration = Turf war
Both Welfare Indifference < Turf war < Delegation < Collaboration
Note: Predicted comparisons based on the equilibrium strategies (see Proposition 1).
Figure 2 displays the treatments that correspond to each equilibrium outcome.
were chosen in order to obtain three different patterns as we increase β depending on the pro-
ductivity of A1. For A1s with low productivity, θ1 = 0.55, increasing β results in the pattern:
indifference → delegation. For A1s with high productivity, θ1 = 0.95, increasing β results
in the pattern: indifference → collaboration. Finally, for A1s with intermediate productiv-
ity, θ1 = 0.75, increasing β results in the pattern: indifference→ delegation → collaboration
→ turf war. While this last pattern is arguably the most interesting one, observing the re-
sults for the other two patterns allows us to test whether the detrimental effect of increasing
competition occurs when the model predicts it will.
Based on the model’s predicted equilibrium strategies, we formulate hypotheses concerning
the differences in behavior we expect to find across the various treatments. For simplicity, we
formulate the hypotheses based on the model’s predicted outcomes as opposed to individual
treatments. The hypotheses are presented in Table 2.
4 Results
In order to observe how subjects behave compared to the theoretical predictions, Figure 3
presents the mean actions taken by A1s and A2s over all periods, pooling treatments according
to the model’s theoretical predictions.14 Going from the top-left to the bottom-right, the first
14On average, subjects played 15 periods when the equilibrium prediction was indifference, 20 periods when
it was delegation, 20 periods when it was collaboration, and 5 periods when it was a turf war.
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Delegation
Collaboration
Turf war
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Keep Refer Share
A1’s effort | Keep A1’s effort | Share
A2’s effort | Refer A2’s effort | Share Total welfare
Figure 3. Means of selected variables by equilibrium prediction
Note: From the top-left to the bottom-right: the first three graphs show the mean rate at
which A1 keeps, refers, or shares jurisdiction; the next four graphs show the mean effort rate
of A1/A2 depending on A1’s jurisdiction choice; and last graph shows mean total welfare as
a fraction of the maximum welfare. Error bars correspond to 95% confidence intervals.
three graphs show the mean fraction of times A1s choose to keep, refer, or share jurisdiction.
The next four graphs show the mean fraction of times A1s/A2s exert effort, depending on
whether they were sharing jurisdiction or not. Naturally, effort rates are calculated conditional
on having jurisdiction. Lastly, the eighth graph shows mean total welfare as a fraction of the
maximum welfare (i.e., the sum of both players’ payoffs when both have a high productivity,
jurisdiction, and exert effort: W (θ1 + θ2) − 2k = 0.74). To provide a visual representation
of the variance of each mean, the figure also displays 95% confidence intervals, which we
calculated with regressions using treatment dummy variables as independent variables and
clustering standard errors on matching groups. We used a multinomial probit regression
for the jurisdiction choice, a probit regression for each effort choice, and an ordered probit
regression for welfare (these regressions are available in the appendix).
To evaluate whether the differences observed in Figure 3 are statistically significant we
use the fact that all subjects participated in the four predicted outcomes, which allows us to
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evaluate the effect the equilibrium predictions at the individual level. However, since subjects
repeatedly interacted with each other within matching groups, we construct our indepen-
dent observations by averaging the subjects’ behavior within each matching group. This
procedure gives us 24 observations per equilibrium prediction. Table 3 presents all pairwise
comparisons between equilibrium predictions for the jurisdiction decision, effort choices, and
welfare. Specifically, for each variable, it shows the observed difference in means between
treatments within the various equilibrium predictions and it indicates whether this difference
is statistically significant according to a Wilcoxon signed-ranks test. Given that we are per-
forming multiple pairwise tests for each variable, we determine statistical significance based
on Bonferroni-adjusted p-values.15 As mentioned previously, we also performed these com-
parisons using regressions. Since the results from the regressions are consistent with those of
the nonparametric tests, we relegate the regression analysis to the appendix.
By and large, we find that the subjects’ behavior fits well with the main predictions of
our model. Starting with the effort decision, we observe that effort rates are high when
exerting effort is in the subjects’ self interest. Specifically, the fraction of A1s who exert effort
is significantly higher when the equilibrium prediction is collaboration or turf war (above
93%) compared to when it is indifference or delegation (below 25%). Similarly, the fraction
of A2s who exert effort is significantly higher when the equilibrium prediction is delegation,
collaboration, or turf war (above 92%) compared to when it is indifference (below 26%).16
Thus, the only discernible deviation from the theoretical predictions is that the effort rate of
A1 under shared jurisdiction is significantly higher in indifference than in delegation, which is
driven by the noticeably high effort rate in indifference.17 Positive effort levels in indifference
15For the jurisdiction decision, we multiply p-values by 18 since we run one test per pairwise comparison
for each of the three outcomes (keep, refer, and share). For A1’s/A2’s effort choice, we multiply p-values by
12 since we run one test per pairwise comparison for each jurisdiction choice. Lastly, for welfare, we multiply
p-values by 6 since we run one test per pairwise comparison.
16There is one exception. In spite of the large difference in effort rates between indifference and turf war
after A1 refers, this difference is not statistically significant. However, the lack of significance is due to there
being too few independent observations for this test because referrals are very rare in turf war (they occur only
1% of the time).
17Although we see statistically significant differences in effort rates between delegation and collaboration/turf
war, the magnitude of these differences is very small (8 percentage points or less). Therefore, we do not consider
them to be a substantial deviation from the theoretical predictions.
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than in delegation are consistent with the large literature on cooperation in social dilemmas,
which shows that some individuals are willing to cooperate when everyone’s dominant strategy
is to defect (Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000) but are less willing to do so if cooperation is in the
monetary interest of other players (e.g., see Reuben and Riedl 2009; Glo¨ckner et al. 2011).
In the preceding decision, we observe strong differences in A1’s jurisdiction decision de-
pending on the predicted equilibrium. Remarkably, the rate at which A1s keep jurisdiction
is less than 6% when the equilibrium prediction is delegation or collaboration, but it in-
creases significantly to 84% when the equilibrium prediction is a turf war. Contrary to the
model’s predictions, however, we observe that A1s choose to refer jurisdiction to A2s when the
equilibrium prediction is delegation resulting in significantly less sharing in delegation than in
collaboration. We will come back to this behavior when we analyze the individual treatments.
Finally, although the model does not make a prediction for the jurisdiction decision when the
equilibrium prediction is indifference, we observe that A1s choose to share jurisdiction most
of the time (80%). Note that sharing in this case is consistent with the fact that effort rates
are not exactly zero and are slightly higher when A1 shares.
Lastly, we observe that the total welfare in the experiment conforms with the predicted
comparative statics. Namely, welfare increases significantly as we move from indifference to
delegation and then to collaboration, but it subsequently decreases significantly when the
prediction becomes a turf war.18 In fact, we clearly observe the detrimental effect of turf wars
as total welfare is significantly lower when the equilibrium prediction is a turf war compared
to when it is delegation even though the players’ mean productivity is higher in the former
case.
Next, we take a look at behavior in the individual treatments. We provide a detailed sta-
tistical analysis based on both regressions and nonparametric tests in the appendix. Here, we
concentrate on the behavioral patterns observed above. Figure 4 presents the same statistics
as Figure 3 for each combination of β and θ1. On the whole, we do not find that behavior in
treatments with the same equilibrium prediction differ substantially from each other. There
are some differences, however, which we will highlight below.
Once again, let us start with the effort decision. We can see that, as predicted, the fraction
18Observed total welfare is close to the model’s point predictions: it is slightly higher if the equilibrium
prediction is indifference (0.19 vs. 0.00) or a turf war (0.31 vs. 0.23), and it is slightly lower if the prediction
is delegation (0.45 vs. 0.50) or collaboration (0.89 vs. 0.94).
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of A1s and A2s who exert effort increases with the amount of competition. Specifically, effort
rates are high, above 89%, when β is high enough to give subjects a monetary incentive to
exert effort (i.e., for β ≥ 0.50 if θi = 0.95 or β ≥ 0.80 if θi = 0.75), otherwise effort rates do
not exceed 48%. Figure 4 also reveals that the high effort rate observed when the equilibrium
prediction is indifference is driven by players with high productivity. This observation is
consistent with the literature on social dilemmas, which has documented that individuals are
more willing to cooperate when the benefits of doing so are high relative to the cost (e.g.,
Brandts and Schram 2001).
In the jurisdiction decision, we observe that increasing competition has a strong effect on
whether A1s keep jurisdiction to themselves, but only if A1 is of intermediate productivity
(θ1 = 0.75). The rate at which A1s with intermediate productivity keep jurisdiction is at
most 8% when β ≤ 0.80 but it rises to 84% when β = 0.95. By contrast, A1s with low or
high productivity (θ1 = 0.55 or θ1 = 0.95) keep jurisdiction at most 9% of the time at all four
values of β. As mentioned above, a behavior that is not in line with the model’s predictions
is the referral rate when the equilibrium prediction is delegation. We can see in Figure 4
that the high referral rate occurs in the two delegation treatments where β = 0.50. In other
words, in the two treatments where the difference between referring and sharing jurisdiction
is the lowest. Therefore, once again, deviations from the model’s predictions occur when such
deviations are not very costly. It is a common finding in experiments for deviations from Nash
equilibria to occur more often when they are less harmful. We would like to note, however, that
while such low-cost deviations can lead to substantial differences in behavior and welfare in
some games (see Goeree and Holt 2001), this is not the case in our model. More precisely, the
unexpectedly high effort and referral rates do not affect our model’s more notable implications
such as the nonlinear effect of competition and productivity on production and welfare.
Finally, consistent with the theoretical predictions, we can see that even though the in-
centive to provide effort increases with competition at all productivity levels, total welfare
does not. In particular, in pairs in which A1 is of intermediate productivity, welfare increases
as β goes from 0.15 to 0.80, but subsequently decreases when β reaches 0.95. In pairs where
A1 is of low or high productivity, welfare does not decrease as β increases. As a consequence,
pairs with an A1 with θ1 = 0.75 and β = 0.95 end up producing less than pairs with a less
productive A1 (θ1 = 0.55, as long as β ≥ 0.50).
In summary, our experimental results are in line with our model’s theoretical results. First,
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Figure 4. Means of selected variables by treatment
Note: From the top-left to the bottom-right: the first three graphs depict the mean rate at
which A1 keeps, refers, or shares jurisdiction; the next four graphs depict the mean effort
rate of A1/A2 depending on the A1’s jurisdiction choice; and last graph depicts mean total
welfare as a fraction of maximum welfare (i.e., the sum of payoffs when both players have
high productivity, jurisdiction, and exert effort). Error bars correspond to 95% confidence
intervals.
we clearly observe how increasing the incentive to compete initially increases production
as it provides an incentive to exert effort. Second, we also observe that further increases
in competitive incentives can result in suboptimal jurisdiction decisions and a considerable
reduction of production (and welfare). Third, we find that such turf wars occur when the
productivity difference between A1 and A2 is neither too large nor too small.
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5 Extensions
Here we discuss three interesting variations of the basic game, which are formally solved
in the appendix. Our objective is to show that the theoretical predictions from the basic
model are robust to small changes in payoff structure, effort assumptions, and informational
assumptions.
5.1 Fixed prize
A straightforward extension addresses environments where the competitive prize is a fixed
amount. This may be the case, for example, if agents compete for a promotion to a predeter-
mined office. The model with a fixed prize is identical to the basic model, with the exception
that the prize for victory is simply β instead of β(x1 + x2).
The results are qualitatively similar to those of the basic model. An agent remains more
inclined to work when she has sole jurisdiction compared to shared jurisdiction since the lat-
ter entails a positive probability of losing the prize. A1’s anticipation of A2’s effort response
results in similar patterns of outcomes. If A2 is not very productive, productive originators
prefer autarchy, while less productive ones prefer indifference or referral. If A2 is productive
enough, the equilibrium outcome is delegation if the originator is of low productivity, collab-
oration if the originator is of high productivity, and a turf war if the originator is moderately
productive. The comparative statics on outcomes behave in an intuitive manner, and resem-
ble those of the basic model. A bigger prize enlarges the set of θ1 values for which there is
a turf war and correspondingly reduce delegation. Finally, compared to the variable prize
model, turf wars appear at lower values of θ1 because originators can guarantee themselves a
substantial prize even if their output is low.
5.2 Multiple agents and synergies
We next consider a version of the fixed prize model, which we generalize in two ways. First, we
allow n ≥ 2 agents. Second, we use the more general CES production function for determining
output x = (
∑
i θ
ρ
i )
1/ρ
, where
∑
i θi = 1 and ρ > 0. If ρ = 1 then abilities are perfect
substitutes. For ρ < 1 there are synergies in working together (the total ability is larger than
the sum of the abilities), and conversely for ρ > 1. For simplicity, we work out the model
without moral hazard (i.e., the case where k = 0), which implies that agents automatically
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exert effort and the only possible outcomes are turf war and collaboration.
To start, consider the case where the sole originator, A1, can share with either all other
agents or none. If there are synergies, namely for ρ < 1, we show that there is a cutoff value
of θ1 above which the originator shares. Moreover, the greater the synergy, the more inclined
the originator will be to share. For ρ > 1, however, the pattern is reversed: there is another
cutoff value of θ1 below which the originator shares.
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Next, let us consider what would happen if the originator could choose the agents she
shares with. In particular, suppose that A1 can share jurisdiction with one additional agent.
As above, we find that, as θ1 increases, sharing with a given agent becomes easier if ρ < 1,
but may become harder if ρ > 1. The latter happens because the contribution of sharing
toward the collective outcome becomes smaller, while the probability of winning the prize
remains the same. We also show that the originator picks the strongest available partner
when ρ > 1, as the expected loss in the prize is always offset by productivity gains. However,
when ρ < 1, partner choice depends on the originator’s productivity. Specifically, A1 prefers
the strongest partner if she is stronger than the originator, but this preference may be reversed
if the strongest potential partner is weaker than the originator.20
In summary, although not directly comparable, the results for ρ < 1 are consistent with
the basic model in that the most productive originators share. However, the results for ρ > 1
show that the pattern of collaboration can be very different in the absence of production
synergies.
5.3 Incomplete information
We now discuss a version of the game in which each agent is uncertain of the other’s produc-
tivity. We retain the fixed reward, but make three simplifying modifications. First, we do not
consider referrals. Second, A1 is assumed to always work. Third, uncertainty over productiv-
ity eliminates the need for  in the basic model; thus, we assume Ai wins the prize if xi > x−i.
19In the linear case, ρ = 1, the propensity to share does not depend on θ1, and depends only on the size of
the prize β relative to the policy motivation m.
20We also consider a second case where the originator can choose t identical agents (i.e., with θi = θ) to
partner with. This objective is simpler than that with heterogeneous agents, and so it is straightforward to
show that there is less sharing as the prize becomes relatively more important. Somewhat more interestingly,
there is never an interior solution, and so the originator will share with either no agents or all agents.
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The model might therefore describe a situation in which the originator is required to work
on a project, but still decides whether to share jurisdiction or not. In this environment, the
originator’s sharing decision serves a signal of the originator’s productivity.
In the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game, sufficiently productive originators share
and sufficiently productive partners work. The prize β plays a role similar to that in the basic
model. Low values of β are undesirable because they provide A2 with too little incentive to
work, but high values are also undesirable as they decrease A1’s propensity to share juris-
diction. As in the fixed-prize model, for a given β, less productive originators are the ones
responsible for turf wars.21
6 Discussion
The goal of this paper is largely positive: we attempt to formalize the popular notion of turf
wars in organizations. As we argue, the minimal necessary components of a turf war are
joint production, competition, and property rights over jurisdiction. From this starting point,
our model produces a unique equilibrium in which high-productivity originators share and
high-productivity partners exert effort. One implication is that turf battles hurt most when
collaboration is most needed; that is, when originators have moderate productivity. Perhaps
most prominently, it shows that the reward from competition, β, can both help and hurt
collaboration. While competition always mitigates moral hazard and free riding by inducing
effort, high levels of competition can encourage originators to “go it alone.”
Despite their ubiquity, turf wars are difficult to observe directly. In fact, inefficient lack of
cooperation is present and most prominent precisely when the failure to share a task is hard
to monitor and hence discipline directly. Our experiment therefore sought to test the model’s
predictions about originator sharing behavior when there is an able partner willing to work.
Consistent with a host of previous results, subjects cooperated somewhat more often than
predicted by the model. Yet the main predictions about the role of competitive versus policy-
motivated incentives are supported, and in particular there is support for the non-monotonic
effects of competitive rewards on collaboration.
21Note that in the incomplete information model whether sharing (keeping) results in collaboration (a turf
war) depends on the drawn value of θ2. That is, except in the limiting case where full sharing occurs and
k → 0, there is a set A2s with sufficiently productivity who do not find it optimal to provide effort.
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While we view our basic model as capturing a necessary and sufficient condition for turf
wars, other factors may also matter. Agents are limited by being unable to strike bargains to
divide the surplus with either each other or the principal. We also do not consider organiza-
tional solutions such as the selection of agent types, or incentives provided through oversight
or contracts. Yet, the model allows us to speculate on some possible remedies. For example,
a principal could use a performance cutoff below which β is not awarded to any agent. This
scheme might correspond to an organization’s implicit threat to fill a higher position with an
outsider rather than promoting from within. This might produce collaboration by reducing
the payoff from autarchy, but it may also reduce the incentive of certain agent types to work.
Another important question concerns the way in which effort is aggregated. In our game
theoretic model, outputs are perfect substitutes. However, our decision theoretic extension
suggests the possibility that returns to scale and complementarities might affect sharing pat-
terns in a way that our other extensions did not. In an environment with rapidly diminishing
returns to collaborative effort, a hypothetical principal might actually want autarchy.
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Appendices (for online publication)
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
We can rewrite
θH ≡
−
(
m+ β2
)
+
√(
m+ 32β
)2
+ 2β (k − (m+ β))
β
It is then easily verified that k = m+ β iff θL = θH = 1, and k = 0 iff θL = θH = 0. The rest
is straightforward, as squaring both sides we obtain.
θH ≡
−
(
m+ β2
)
+
√
(m+ β2 )
2 + 2βk
β
>
k
m+ β
≡ θ√(
m+
β
2
)2
+ 2βk >
kβ
m+ β
+
(
m+
β
2
)
1 >
k
m+ β
Since k < m+ β, we have 0 < θL < θH < 1 
Proof of Proposition 1
(i) and (ii) are derived in the text. For (iii), A2 always works as θ2 ∈ (θH , 1), so we have three
cases.
1. For θ1 ∈ (0, θL), A1 does not work. Since A2 works if she has jurisdiction, A1 re-
ceives zero from keeping and strictly positive utility from sharing. Thus the outcome is
delegation.
2. For θ1 ∈ (θH , 1) A1 always works and prefers keep (resulting in autarchy) over share
(resulting in collaboration) if
m(θ1 + θ2) + β(θ1 + θ2)ω1(θ1, θ2)− k < (m+ β)θ1 − k (A1)
βθ21 − βθ1 + βθ2(1− θ2) + 2mθ2 < 0 (A2)
The solutions (θ−, θ+) to (A2) for θ1 are given by (6). Hence, if θ1 < θ− or θ1 > θ+,
then A1 shares. If θ1 ∈ (θ−, θ+) then A1 keeps. If θ− and θ+ are not real-valued, then
A1 shares.
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3. For θ1 ∈ (θL, θH), A1 prefers share (resulting in delegation) to keep (resulting in
autarchy) if
mθ2 + βθ2 ω1(0, θ2) ≥ (m+ β)θ1 − k
θ1 ≤ θ˜ ≡
mθ2 + βθ2
1−θ2
2 + k
m+ β
(A3)
Since θ˜ > θL always, this case breaks into two subcases:
3a. θ˜ > θH , so θ˜ is irrelevant: A1 delegates always in this region, hence at θ1 = θ
H A1,
by definition indifferent between collaboration and delegation, prefers either over
autarchy. If either θ− and θ+ are not real-valued, or θ+ < θH , then A1 does not
choose keep for any θ1 > θ
H . Combining the previous cases, the outcomes are
delegation if θ1 ∈
(
0, θL
)
delegation if θ1 ∈
(
θL, θH
)
collaboration if θ1 ∈
(
θH , 1
)
.
And when θ− and θ+ are real-valued and θ+ > θH we have
delegation if θ1 ∈
(
0, θL
)
delegation if θ1 ∈
(
θL, θH
)
collaboration if θ1 ∈
(
θH , θ−
)
autarchy (turf war) if θ1 ∈ (θ−, θ+)
collaboration if θ1 ∈ (θ+, 1) .
The region (θH , θ−) is possibly empty, in which case the autarchy region is (θH , θ+).
Combining outcomes yields the result.
3b. θ˜ < θH , so θ˜ is relevant: A1 delegates for θ1 < θ˜ and keeps otherwise. Hence
at θ1 = θ
H A1, by definition indifferent between collaboration and delegation,
prefers keep over either. It is straightforward to verify that θ+ and θ− are always
real-valued in this case. Combining the previous cases, the outcomes are
delegation if θ1 ∈ (0, θL)
delegation if θ1 ∈ (θL, θ˜)
autarchy (turf war) if θ1 ∈ (θ˜, θH)
autarchy (turf war) if θ1 ∈ (θH , θ+)
collaboration if θ1 ∈ (θ+, 1)
The region (θH , θ+) is possibly empty, in which case there can be no autarchy
for any θ1 > θ
H , so the autarchy region is (θ˜, θH) and the collaboration region is
(θH , 1). Combining outcomes yields the result 
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Proof of Proposition 2
Rewriting the thresholds so that 2m+ β = W yields
θL =
k
m+ β
=
2k
W + β
θH =
2k(
m+ β2
)
+
√
(m+ β2 )
2 + 2βk
=
2k
W/2 +
√
(W/2)2 + 2βk
θ˜ =
mθ2 + βθ2(1− θ2)/2 + k
m+ β
= θ22
(
−1 +W 1 + 1/θ2
W + β
)
+
2k
W + β
θ− =
1
2
−
√
1
4
− θ2
(
W
β
− θ2
)
θ+ =
1
2
+
√
1
4
− θ2
(
W
β
− θ2
)
From these expressions it is clear that θL, θH , θ˜, and θ− are decreasing in β, while θ+ is
increasing in β. Additionally, θL, θH , and θ˜ are increasing in k, while θ− are θ+ are constant
in k. The results on the regions follow from these relationships 
B Extensions
In this section, we describe and solve the variations of our basic game that are discussed in
the main body of the paper. All proofs are provided at the end of each extension.
B.1 Fixed prize
The model with a fixed prize is identical to the basic model, with the exception that the prize
for victory is simply β instead of β(x1 + x2). We retain the assumption that no prize is given
when neither agent exerts effort.
In the second period, the effort decision is qualitatively similar to the one obtained in the
variable prize case. Following A1’s choice to share, Ai works when her counterpart works if
m(θ1 + θ2) + β ωi(θi, θ−i) − k ≥ mθ−i + β ωi(0, θ−i). Likewise, Ai works when her partner
does not work if mθi + β ωi(θi, 0) − k ≥ 0. As in the basic model, both of these expressions
evaluate to the same threshold value for θi, which we define as follows
θi ≥ θHf ≡
k
m+ β2
. (B4)
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It is also straightforward to verify that when Ai’s partner does not work, then Ai will work
if θi exceeds the following threshold.
θi ≥ θLf ≡
k − β
m
. (B5)
The thresholds θHf and θ
L
f work analogously to the thresholds θ
H and θL in the basic
model. For θi < θ
L
f , Ai exerts no effort, and for θi > θ
H
f , Ai always exerts effort. For
θi ∈ (θLf , θHf ), Ai works only if she has sole jurisdiction. Again, each agent is more inclined to
work when she has sole jurisdiction as opposed to shared jurisdiction, since the latter entails
a positive probability of losing β even when the partner exerts no effort.
A1’s first period strategy anticipates A2’s effort response. The next proposition summa-
rizes outcomes and comparative statics for all combinations of θ1 and θ2. The result makes
use of the following notation. For θ1 ∈ (θLf , θHf ), A1 is indifferent between keeping and sharing
at the following threshold for θ1:
θ−f ≡
k − β2
m
+ θ2
(
1− β
2m
)
. (B6)
It is straightforward to verify that θ−f > θ
L
f . Next, for θ1 > θ
H
f , A1 is indifferent between
keeping and sharing at the following threshold for θ1:
θ+f ≡ 1 + θ2
(
1− 2m
β
)
. (B7)
Proposition B1 (Outcomes under fixed prize)
(i) If θ2 ∈ (0, θLf ) then indifference if θ1 < θLfautarchy if θ1 > θLf .
(ii) If θ2 ∈ (θLf , θHf ) then referral if θ1 <
(
θ2 + θ
L
f
)
autarchy∗ if θ1 >
(
θ2 + θ
L
f
)
.
(iii) If θ2 ∈ (θHf , 1) then
delegation∗ if θ1 < min{θ−f , θHf }
turf war∗ if θ1 ∈
(
min{θ−f , θHf },min{max{θ+f , θHf }, 1}
)
collaboration∗ if θ1 > max{θ+f , θHf },
where (∗) denotes regions that may be empty.
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Figure B1. Fixed prize outcomes as a function of β and θ1
Note: Here 2m+ β = 1, k = 0.15, and θ2 = 0.95, which ensures that A2 always works when
given jurisdiction. Compared to the variable-prize model, the independence of the size of the
reward on collaboration increases the range of parameters under which turf wars occur.
The main findings are analogous to those of the basic model. For θ2 < θ
H
f , A1s with
high productivity prefer autarchy, while those with low productivity prefer indifference or,
when A2 is willing to work under sole jurisdiction, referral. Sharing occurs only if θ2 > θ
H
f ,
in which case turf wars occur for “intermediate” values of θ1: the originator chooses to keep
jurisdiction because sharing would greatly reduce her chances of receiving the prize to a high-
ability partner. By contrast, when the originator’s productivity is low enough to make her
either unwilling to exert effort or unlikely to win, the result is delegation. Finally, when the
originator’s productivity level guarantees a sufficiently high probability of winning the prize,
the result is collaboration.
The comparative statics on outcomes behave in an intuitive manner, and resemble those of
the basic model. When the value of the prize is high relative to the common value payoff (i.e.,
β > 2m), there is no collaboration. Higher values of β enlarge the set of θ1 values for which
there is a turf war and correspondingly reduce delegation. For β < 2m there is collaboration,
and collaboration is increasingly desirable to the originator as θ2 decreases. Finally, as k
increases, the set of θ1 values resulting in delegation expands. Figure B1 illustrates some of
these relationships, using the same parameters as in Figure 1.
We note finally that in the special case where effort is costless (k = 0), the fixed prize
model produces a simpler equilibrium than the basic model. In both models, both agents
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work when they have jurisdiction, and thus the only possible results are collaboration and
autarchy. With a fixed prize, low productivity originators will keep (resulting in autarchy),
while high productivity originators will share (resulting in collaboration). By contrast, in the
basic model, Proposition 1(ii) shows that the lowest-type originators share as well. Intuitively,
the prize being fixed means it is guaranteed in autarchy even to low ability types who, unlike
what happened in the basic model, now no longer have to use the work of higher ability
collaborators to successfully complete the project.
Proof of Proposition B1
Second period strategies are characterized above. In the first period:
(i) When θ2 ∈ (0, θLf ), A1 anticipates no effort from A2. A1 therefore works if θ1 > θLf
(resulting in indifference), and does not work otherwise (resulting in autarchy).
(ii) When θ2 ∈ (θLf , θHf ), sharing results in no effort by A2. Thus, A1 keeps if she prefers to
work herself, and refers if she prefers that A2 work alone, or mθ1 + β − k > mθ2. This
reduces to θ1 > θ2 + θ
L
f . Thus, higher values of θ1 result in autarchy and lower values
result in referral.
(iii) When θ2 > θ
H
f , since A2 is guaranteed to work, delegation yields a higher payoff than
referral. A1 therefore effectively decides over turf war, delegation, and collaboration, as
follows. For θ1 < θ
L
f , A1 exerts no effort and delegation is clearly her most preferred
outcome; thus, she shares. For θ1 ∈ (θLf , θHf ), A1 exerts no effort when sharing. She then
prefers keeping to sharing when mθ1 +β− k > mθ2 +βω(0, θ2), or θ1 > θ−f . Combining
the subcases where θ1 < θ
H
f , A1 shares for all θ1 < min{θ−f , θHf }, and keeps otherwise.
Finally, for θ1 > θ
H
f , A1 exerts effort when sharing. She the prefers sharing to keeping
when m(θ1 + θ2) + βω(θ1, θ2)− k > mθ1 + β − k, or θ1 > θ+f . Combining the outcomes
from these regions produces the result 
B.2 Multiple agents and synergies
We next consider a version of the fixed prize model without moral hazard, namely in which
agents automatically exert effort, as in the k = 0 case of the previous models. We generalize
the model in two ways. First, we allow n ≥ 2 agents, each with corresponding productivity
θi ∈ (0, 1). To do this in a simple way we let
∑
θi = 1 and also let each Ai’s probability of
winning the prize β be θi when all agents have jurisdiction. A1 remains the originator, and
she can share with either all other agents or none. Second, we use the more general CES
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production function for determining output.
Since there is no effort choice, the problem reduces to A1’s sharing decision and the only
possible outcomes are turf war and collaboration (i.e., not sharing is obviously inefficient).
Given sharing by A1, agent Ai’s expected utility can be written as
ui = m
(∑
θρi
)1/ρ
+ βθi.
Here ρ > 0 is the substitutability or complementarity of abilities. For example, if ρ = 1 then
abilities are perfect substitutes, for ρ < 1 there are synergies in working together (the total
ability is larger than the sum of the abilities), and conversely for ρ > 1. As in the basic fixed
prize, zero effort cost game, the originator’s utility from not sharing is simply mθ1 + β.
A1 shares if and only if
m
( n∑
i=1
θρi
)1/ρ
− θ1
 > β (1− θ1) .
It will then be convenient to express the condition for sharing as
A(θ1) ≡ (
∑n
i=1 θ
ρ
i )
1/ρ − θ1
1− θ1 >
β
m
.
A(θ1) can be understood as a measure of the A1’s net gain from sharing.
As in the preceding analysis, we are mainly interested in seeing how the originator’s
productivity affects the propensity to share. Since productivity levels sum to a constant, the
results depend on how changes in θ1 affect θi for i 6= 1. One simple way to do this is to assign
non-negative linear “weights” to each player’s productivity parameter, of the following form:
θi = pii(1− θ1).
It is straightforward to derive each pii. Note that θ1 = 1 − θi/pii for each i 6= 1, which
implies that θi/pii is constant for all i 6= 1. Furthermore, to ensure that
∑
i θi = 1, the weights
pii must satisfy
∑
i 6=j pii = 1. This implies that for each i 6= 1,∑
k 6=j
pik =
∑
k 6=j
θk
θi
pii = 1,
and therefore we have the following unique weights for each pair
pii =
θi∑
k 6=1 θk
.
This is simply agent i’s relative weight among the set of A2s. These weights imply that
as θ1 increases, the remaining θi’s must all shrink in proportion with their relative size. The
first result presents the basic comparative statics of the model.
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Proposition B2 (Sharing with multiple agents and synergies)
(i) For any θ1 ∈ [0, 1), ρ Q 1 =⇒ dAdθ1 R 0.
(ii) For any θ1 ∈ (0, 1), ρ Q 1 =⇒ A(θ1) R 1, and
A(0) =
 1 if n = 2Q 1 if ρ R 1 if n > 2.
(iii) dAdρ < 0.
Part (i) of Proposition B2 shows how synergies and A1’s type matter for A1’s sharing
decision, and is the main point of comparison with the basic model. For ρ < 1 and β/m
sufficiently high, there is a “cutoff” value of θ1 above which A1 shares. This is consistent with
the basic model, where the most productive A1s share, conditional upon being willing to work.
From a welfare perspective this is a bad result, as it would be better for lower productivity
A1s to share. For ρ > 1 and β/m sufficiently low, however, the pattern is reversed: there is
another cutoff value of θ1 below which A1 shares. Low type A1s also shared in some cases of
the basic model, but always along with high types. Interestingly, in the linear case (ρ = 1)
the propensity to share does not depend on θ1, and depends only on the agents’ relative
policy motivation. Thus with the caveat that the results are not directly comparable with
those of the basic model because the values of θi are not independent, the result shows that
the pattern of collaboration can be at least somewhat sensitive to the presence of production
synergies. Part (ii) shows how the critical value for β/m depends on synergies. For n > 2,
values of β/m very close to 1 can make sharing either optimal for all θ (ρ < 1) or not optimal
for all θ (ρ > 1). Part (iii) simply establishes the intuitive result that the benefit of sharing is
decreasing in ρ (i.e., increasing in synergy). Thus, the greater the synergy, the more inclined
A1 will be to share.
We finally consider what would happen if the originator could choose the set of agents
she shares with. There are two cases. First, suppose that A1 can share the task with only
one additional agent. As the probability of victory conditional upon sharing with Ak is
θ1/(θ1 + θk), A1 would be willing to add agent Ak if
m
(
θρ1 + θ
ρ
k
)1/ρ
+ β
θ1
θ1 + θk
> mθ1 + β(
θρ1 + θ
ρ
k
)1/ρ − θ1 > θk
θ1 + θk
(
β
m
)
.
Note that this expression is identical to that of the two-agent case when θ1 + θk = 1.
There are two effects of increasing θk: increasing the probability of a successful outcome, and
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decreasing the probability of winning the award. The preceding expression can be rewritten
as follows:
A(θ1, θk) = (θ1 + θk)
[((
θ1
θk
)ρ
+ 1
)1/ρ
− θ1
θk
]
>
β
m
. (B8)
This expression implies that holding θ1/θk constant, sharing becomes harder as θ1 + θk
shrinks. This happens because the contribution of sharing toward the collective outcome
becomes smaller, while the probability of winning the prize remains the same. Likewise,
holding θ1 + θk constant, sharing becomes easier (harder) as θ1 increases if ρ < (>) 1. The
next comment characterizes A1’s choice of a single partner.
Comment B1 (Optimal partner)
For potential partner Ak:
(i) If ρ < 1, ∂A∂θ1 > 0. If ρ > 1,
∂A
∂θ1
> 0 if θ1 ≤ θk and ρ sufficiently large; limρ→∞ ∂A∂θ1 = 0
if θ1 > θk.
(ii) If ρ > 1, ∂A∂θk > 0. If ρ < 1,
∂A
∂θk
> 0 if θ1 ≤ θk; limρ→∞ ∂A∂θk < 0 if θ1 > θk.
Part (i) considers A1’s productivity. When ρ < 1 (i.e., there are synergies), high pro-
ductivity A1s will be more inclined to share with a given partner. The results are weaker
when ρ > 1 but A1s with high productivity will often do better in a partnership than those
with low productivity. Part (ii) considers the more interesting question of whom A1 would
choose. Often more productive partners are preferred. Interestingly, when ρ > 1 A1 prefers
partners with high productivity because the expected loss in the victory bonus is now offset by
productivity gains. This is also true when ρ < 1 and potential partners are more productive
than A1. The relationship may be reversed if potential partners are less productive than A1.
Next, consider a second case where the originator can choose t agents to partner with, but
all agents are identical (θi = θ). Thus, the originator’s objective is
L(t) ≡ m
(
t
(
1
n
)ρ)1/ρ
+
β
t
. (B9)
where t ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
This objective is considerably simpler than that with heterogeneous agents, and so it is
straightforward to derive the following comment.
Comment B2 (Optimal number of homogeneous partners)
If βm ≥ n
1/ρ−1
n−1 , then t
∗ = 1; otherwise, t∗ = n.
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As intuition would suggest, when the bonus from victory is relatively important, then
there is less sharing. Somewhat more interestingly, there is never an interior solution, and so
the originator will share with either no agents or all agents.
Proof of Proposition B2
(i) Letting k1 = θ1/(1− θ1), this gives us:
A(θ1) =
(
θρ1 +
∑
i 6=1(pii(1− θ1))ρ
)1/ρ − θ1
1− θ1
=
kρ1 +∑
i 6=1
(pii)
ρ
1/ρ − k1.
A(θ1) has the same sign as
dA
dk1
. The derivative with respect to k1 is
dA
dk1
=
kρ1 +∑
i 6=1
(pii)
ρ

1−ρ
ρ
kρ−11 − 1
=
1 + k−ρ1 ∑
i 6=1
(pii)
ρ

1−ρ
ρ
− 1,
which is positive (zero) (negative) if
1− ρ
ρ
ln
1 + k−ρ1 ∑
i 6=1
(pii)
ρ
 > (=)(<) 0.
Since the term in parentheses is greater than 1, dAdk1 > (=)(<) 0 if ρ < (=)(<) 1.
(ii) Note first that
A(0) =
∑
i 6=1
(pii)
ρ
1/ρ .
For n = 2, there is only one term in the summation, and pii = 1, so A(0) = 1. For
n > 2, since
∑
i 6=1 pii = 1, it is clear that A(0) > (=)(<) 1 if ρ < (=)(>) 1. Finally, since
A′(θ1) > (=)(<) 0 for ρ < (=)(>) 1, we have A(θ1) > (=)(<) 1 when ρ < (=)(>) 1 for
θ1 > 0.
(iii) Let A˜(ρ) =
(
kρ1 +
∑
i 6=1(pii)
ρ
)1/ρ
, which has the same derivative as A(·) with respect to
ρ. Differentiating A˜(θ1) with respect to ρ, we obtain
1
A˜
dA˜
dρ
=
1
ρ
kρ1 ln k1 +
∑
i 6=1(pii)
ρ lnpii
kρ1 +
∑
i 6=1(pii)ρ
− 1
ρ2
ln
kρ1 +∑
i 6=1
(pii)
ρ
 .
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Observe that A˜(ρ) > 0 for all ρ, and therefore dA˜dρ is negative if
kρ1 ln k1 +
∑
i 6=1(pii)
ρ lnpii
kρ1 +
∑
i 6=1(pii)ρ
<
1
ρ
ln
kρ1 +∑
i 6=1
(pii)
ρ
 .
Since pii > 0 for all i and lnpii < 0, the left-hand side of the expression above is strictly
less than ln k1. And since pii > 0 for all i, the right-hand side is strictly greater than
ln k1, thus establishing the result 
Proof of Comment B1
(i) As derived in the proof of Proposition B2, the bracketed expression in (B8) is positive
and increasing in θ1 if ρ < 1. It follows that A(θ1, θk) is increasing in θ1 if ρ ≤ 1. For
ρ > 1, we differentiate with respect to θ1, and so
∂A
∂θ1
< (>) 0 if
(θ1 + θk)
[((
θ1
θk
)ρ
+ 1
)1/ρ−1(
θ1
θk
)ρ−1 1
θk
− 1
θk
]
+
((
θ1
θk
)ρ
+ 1
)1/ρ
− θ1
θk
< (>) 0.
Following the proof of Proposition B2, the bracketed expression is negative for ρ > 1,
while
((
θ1
θk
)ρ
+ 1
)1/ρ
− θ1θk is positive. Letting k = θ1/θk and simplifying, we have
∂A
∂θ1
< (>) 0 if
1
(kρ + 1)1−1/ρ
− 2k + 1
2kρ + kρ−1 + 1
< (>) 0.
There are two cases. First, suppose k ≤ 1 (i.e., θ1 < θk). Since (kρ + 1)1/ρ−1 ≤ 1, it
follows that dAdθ1 < 0 if: 2k
ρ + kρ−1 < 2k, or kρ−1 < 2k/(2k+ 1). This is clearly satisfied
for ρ sufficiently large. Second, suppose k > 1. The limits of both fractions in the above
expression as ρ→∞ are clearly 0. Thus limρ→∞ ∂A∂θ1 = 0.
(ii) As derived in the proof of Proposition B2, the bracketed expression in (B8) is positive
and increasing in θk if ρ > 1. It follows that A(θ1, θk) is increasing in θk if ρ ≥ 1. For
ρ < 1, we differentiate with respect to θk and substitute k = θ1/θk:, which gives
∂A
∂θk
= (θ1 + θk)
[
−
((
θ1
θk
)ρ
+ 1
)1/ρ−1(
θρ1
θρ+1k
)
+
θ1
θ2k
]
+
((
θ1
θk
)ρ
+ 1
)1/ρ
− θ1
θk
= k2 − (kρ + 1)1/ρ−1 kρ(k + 1) + (kρ + 1)1/ρ .
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Thus ∂A∂θk > (<) 0 if
k2 > (<) (kρ + 1)1/ρ
[
kρ(k + 1)
kρ + 1
− 1
]
.
There are two cases. First, suppose k ≤ 1. Then ∂A∂θk > 0 if kρ(k+1) ≤ kρ+1, or kρ+1 ≤
1, which holds for any ρ > 0. Second, suppose k > 1. Since limρ→∞(kρ + 1)1/ρ = k,
we have limρ→∞ ∂A∂θk < 0 if limρ→∞
kρ(k+1)
kρ+1 > k + 1. Applying L’Hopital’s Rule yields
limρ→∞
kρ(k+1)
kρ+1 =
(k+1)kρ ln k+kρ
kρ ln k = k + 1 +
1
ln k , thus proving the result 
Proof of Comment B2
We first give the condition under which A1 prefers 1 partner to n partners. This is the case if
m
n
+ β ≥ mn1/ρ−1 + β
n
β
m
≥ n
1/ρ − 1
n− 1 . (B10)
Next we derive conditions under which A1’s objective is either strictly increasing or de-
creasing. Differentiating the objective L(t) (see (B9)) yields L′(t) = mt1/ρ−1/(nρ) − βt−2.
This implies that L′(1) = m/(nρ) − β, which is positive if β/m < 1/(nρ). Note also that
L′(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [1, n] if mt1/ρ+1/(nρ)− β > 0. Since this expression is increasing in t, it
follows that L′(t) > 0 for all t ∈ [1, n] iff L′(1) > 0. Likewise, L′(n) < 0 if β/m > n1/ρ/ρ, and
L′(t) < 0 for all t ∈ [1, n] iff L′(n) < 0.
Thus, there can only be a corner solution (B10) if β/m 6∈ [1/(nρ), n1/ρ/ρ]. Moreover,
for β/m in this interval, L′(1) < 0 and L′(n) > 0. By the continuity of L(·), this implies
that there cannot be a local interior maximum if there is a unique t for which L′(t) = 0.
Manipulating L′(t), we have L′(t) = 0 if
t1/ρ+1 =
βρn
m
,
which implies a unique t. Hence the maximum must be at a corner, which again implies that
the solution is characterized by condition (B10) 
B.3 Incomplete Information
We now discuss a version of the game in which each agent is uncertain of the other’s productiv-
ity. Specifically, suppose that θi ∼ U [0, 1] for agent Ai. In this environment, the originator’s
sharing decision serves a signal of the originator’s productivity.
We retain the fixed reward and make three other modifications to further simplify the
analysis. First, we do not consider referrals. Second, A1 is assumed always to work, with her
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effort level denoted simply by e. Conditional upon Ai having jurisdiction, output xi is then
x1 = θ1 ∼ U [0, 1]
x2 =
 θ2 ∼ U [0, 1] if e = 10 if e = 0.
Third, uncertainty over productivity eliminates the need for  in the basic model; thus, agent
Ai wins the prize β if xi > x−i. The model might therefore describe a situation in which A1
is formally required to work on a project, but might still share jurisdiction.
We characterize a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game. As the subsequent derivations
show, there is essentially a unique equilibrium. Formally, strategies consist of A1’s sharing
choice s ∈ {share, keep} and A2’s effort level e ∈ {0, 1} conditional upon having jurisdiction.
A2 also has posterior beliefs over θ1 given A1’s sharing decision, denoted ρ : {share, keep} →
P, where P is the set of measurable subsets of [0, 1]. These beliefs are consistent with Bayes’
rule along the equilibrium path. An out of equilibrium information set can only be encountered
if A1 shares when she was not expected to do so. In these cases, we simply assume that A2’s
beliefs are concentrated on θ1 = 1. Although the equilibrium does not require such extreme
beliefs, this designates the type that would benefit most from sharing, since she would win
with probability one.
We begin by considering the subgame following A1’s choice to share, where agent A2 has
posterior beliefs about A1’s productivity that are uniformly distributed on the interval (θ, θ].
While this is not a fully general treatment of A2’s possible beliefs, we will subsequently argue
that A1’s sharing strategies are monotonic and therefore must take this form in equilibrium.
A2 works if
m (E[θ1| share] + θ2)− k + β ω(θ, θ, θ2, e) > mE[θ1| share]. (B11)
Here ω(θ, θ, θ2, e) represents the probability that A2 wins. The uniform distribution implies
that
ω(θ, θ, θ2, 1) =

0 if θ2 < θ
θ2−θ
θ−θ if θ2 ∈ [θ, θ]
1 if θ2 > θ,
and expression (B11) simplifies to
mθ2 + β ω(θ, θ, θ2, e) > k.
As intuition would suggest, working becomes more attractive to A2 as m, θ2 and β increase,
and less attractive as k increases. The expression implies that for any (θ, θ], there is a unique
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type θˆ2 such that higher productivity types work and lower productivity types shirk. This
type is given by
θˆ2 =

k
m if θ ≥ km
min
{
1, k(θ−θ)+βθ
m(θ−θ)+β
}
if θ < km .
(B12)
The first line of (B12) gives a corner case where A2 is indifferent between working and
not even though she expects to lose β with certainty. Thus, strong policy motivations alone
can induce some types to work even when they expect to lose with certainty. The second line
gives the interior case where the indifferent A2 expects to win with some probability. Because
this set of types necessarily hits a corner at 1, this threshold must be weakly increasing in θ.
Reducing the set of sharing originator types (i.e., increasing θ) therefore does not expand the
set of partner types willing to work.
Given θˆ2, the probability that A2 will work given (θ, θ] is
φ(θ, θ) = 1− θˆ2. (B13)
And given θ1, the probability that A2 wins conditional upon working is
ξ(θ1) =
 1 if θ1 ≤ θˆ21−θ1
1−θˆ2 if θ1 ≥ θˆ2.
(B14)
Note that if θ1 < θˆ2, then the probability of A1 winning is zero.
We can now characterize A1’s sharing decision. Suppose that in equilibrium, the set of
sharing originators is (θ, θ]. Then A1 shares if
m
(
θ1 + φ(θ, θ)
θˆ2 + 1
2
)
+ (1− φ(θ, θ)ξ(θ1))β > mθ1 + β (B15)
Simplifying, A1 shares if φ(θ, θ) > 0 and
m(θˆ2 + 1)
2
− ξ(θ1)β > 0 (B16)
There are two notable facts about this expression. First, it is independent of φ(·) when
φ(·) 6= 0. Second, it does not depend on the functional form of ξ(·); i.e., it applies to any
measurable sharing strategy on [0, 1]. This implies an important monotonicity feature of
sharing in equilibrium. If any type θ′1 shares in equilibrium, then all higher types will also be
willing to share. To see why, suppose that some type θ′′1 > θ′1 does not share. By sharing out
of equilibrium, she would not affect A2’s strategy, and so would only affect A2’s chances of
winning. Thus, type θ′′1 would automatically satisfy (B16) if type θ′1 does.
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The immediate consequence of the monotonicity of sharing incentives is that when sharing
occurs, the set of sharing types is simply (θ, 1]. The final step in deriving the equilibrium is
then to characterize θ. At an interior solution, this is the (unique) value of θ1 that satisfies
(B16) with equality. Higher values of θ imply lower levels of sharing. There are also corner
solutions, where either no types or all types share.
Our next result describes the outcomes of the incomplete information game. Note that a
difference between these results and those of preceding versions of the game is that collabo-
ration and turf wars can only be probabilistic as they depend on the specific realization of θ2.
That is, a set of sufficiently low types of A2 will find the utility gains from working to not
warrant the effort. Thus, except in the limiting case where full sharing occurs and k → 0,
there is no equilibrium in which A2 always works. We therefore label outcomes where A1
shares and A2 works with positive probability as “possible collaboration” and those where
A1 does not share but A2 would work with positive probability as a “possible turf war.”
Proposition B3 (Outcomes under incomplete information)
(i) (Indifference) If β ≤ k −m, then the outcome is indifference.
(ii) (Possible turf war) If β > k −m and m < min{k, β}, then A1 keeps for all θ1.
(iii) (Possible collaboration) If β ∈
(
k −m, −m+
√
m2+8m(k+m)
4
)
, then A1 shares for all θ1.
(iv) (Possible collaboration and turf war) If the conditions of parts (i)-(iii) are not met, then
the set of sharing types is (θ∗, 1], where
θ∗ =

m(k−β+m)−2β2
m(k−3β+m) if m ≤ k and m ≥ β, or m > k and k+m2 > β
1− m(1−(k/m)2)2β otherwise.
Proposition B3 provides some basic intuitions about the effects of turf battles on sharing.
Part (i) shows that the conditions generating indifference—low β, high k, and low m—are
similar to those in Proposition 1. Parts (ii) and (iii) are the corner cases; in the former,
autarchy is always the result because all A1 types play keep because β is sufficiently high.
In the latter, all types of A1 share because β is moderate and m is high. Finally, part (iv)
is the interior solution, where autarchy results for low values of θ1 and possible collaboration
for higher values.
The role of β in the incomplete information game resembles that of the basic game. Clearly,
extreme values of β are undesirable from the perspective of maximizing joint production;
very low values provide too little incentive to work, and very high values provide too little
incentive to share. Focusing on intermediate values (i.e., parts (iii) and (iv) of Proposition B3),
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increasing β limits A1’s propensity to share. For low values of β in this region there is full
sharing. The following comment establishes that the set of types that share contracts as β
increases.
Comment B3 (Comparative Statics)
θ∗ is increasing in β.
These results show that despite numerous differences across models, two main intuitions
carry over from the basic model. First, high levels of competition will inhibit sharing and
collaboration. Second, conditional upon being willing to work, the highest type originators
will share in equilibrium. This prediction is also consistent with the “synergies” case (ρ < 1)
case of the no-effort model. As with the other models, equilibrium sharing behavior is in some
sense undesirable, as a hypothetical principal or society would prefer that lower types share.
Proof of Proposition B3
We characterize θ∗ by solving (where possible) for the A1 type that is indifferent between
sharing and not sharing, given that all types (θ, 1] share.
We first establish some properties of the cutoff θˆ2 for which all types θ2 < (>) θˆ2 do not
work (work). Let ψ(θ) denote the interior value of θˆ2 from (B12), holding θ = 1. Note that
ψ(x) = x only for x = 1 and x = k/m. Differentiating ψ(·), we obtain
dψ
dθ
≤ 0 ⇔ (β − k)[m(1− θ) + β] +m[k(1− θ) + βθ] ≤ 0. (B17)
Simplifying (B17) yields dψdθ ≤ 0 iff β ≤ k−m. Since ψ(1) = 1, this condition implies ψ(θ) ≥ 1
for all θ ∈ [0, 1] if β ≤ k −m, and ψ(θ) < 1 otherwise.
(i) Suppose β ≤ k−m. Expressions (B12) and (B13) then imply that θˆ2 = 1 and φ(θ, 1) = 0
for all θ ∈ [0, 1], respectively. Applying (B15), A1 is indifferent between share and keep.
(ii) Now suppose β > k −m. Expressions (B12) and (B17) then imply that θˆ2 is weakly
increasing in θ and θˆ2 ∈ (0, 1) for θ ∈ [0, 1). We establish some useful features of the
sharing condition (B16) when evaluated at some θ1 = θ. Define σ(θ) = m(θˆ2 + 1)/2 −
ξ(θ)β as the left-hand side of (B16), evaluated at θ1 = θ. It is easily verified that σ(θ)
is single-valued and continuous on [0, 1]. Next, we show that σ(θ) is strictly increasing
on [0, 1]. Since β > k −m, ψ(θ) is strictly increasing and θˆ2 is weakly increasing. Thus
σ(θ) is strictly increasing if θˆ2 is non-decreasing and ξ(θ) is non-increasing, with one
relationship strict. There are two cases.
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a. Suppose that k/m ≤ 1. Observe that for θ ≤ k/m, θˆ2 = ψ(θ) ≥ θ, and when
θ > k/m, θˆ2 = k/m < θ. Thus by (B14), when θ ≤ k/m, ξ(θ) = 1 (i.e., A2 always
wins conditional upon working). Since dψdθ > 0, σ(θ) is strictly increasing. When
θ > k/m, ξ(θ) = (1 − θ)/(1 − k/m) is obviously strictly decreasing in θ. Since θˆ2
is weakly increasing, σ(θ) is again strictly increasing.
b. Suppose that k/m > 1. Now for all θ, θˆ2 = ψ(θ) ≥ θ; thus by the argument for
k/m ≤ 1 and θ ≤ k/m, ξ(θ) = 1 and σ(θ) is strictly increasing. Since σ(θ) is
increasing, A1 does not share if limθ→1 σ(θ) ≤ 0. There are two subcases. First,
let k/m ≤ 1. Note that θˆ2 = k/m at θ = 1 and ξ(1) = 0, so substituting into σ(·)
the condition for no sharing becomes:
m
2
(
k
m
+ 1
)
< 0. (B18)
This condition is obviously impossible to satisfy, and so σ(1) ≥ 0 and A1 does
not choose keep for all θ1. Second, let k/m > 1. By (B12), θˆ2 = 1 at θ = 1 and
ξ(θ) = 1, so substituting into σ(·) the condition for no sharing simplifies to m < β.
Thus A1 keeps for all θ1 when m < min{k, β}.
(iii) Full sharing occurs in equilibrium if and only if σ(0) ≥ 0. Note that ξ(0) = 1, so
substituting into σ(·) the condition for full sharing becomes
m
2
(
k
m+ β
+ 1
)
− β > 0
m
2
(k +m)− m
2
β − β2 > 0. (B19)
It is easily shown that the last expression has only one positive root, and so all types
share if
β <
−m+√m2 + 8m(k +m)
4
.
(iv) There are two cases.
a. Suppose that k/m < 1. If sharing for all θ1 is not possible, then the analogous case
in part (ii) implies that there exists some interior θ∗ such that σ(θ) = 0. Since θ∗
depends on θˆ2 and θˆ2 is at a corner at θ = k/m, we consider conditions under which
θ∗ will lie on either side of k/m. As σ(θ) is increasing, θ∗ < k/m iff σ(k/m) > 0,
or
k +m
2
> β. (B20)
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If (B20) holds, then since θ∗ < k/m implies θˆ2 < k/m, θ∗ is characterized by
substituting ψ(θ) and ξ(θ) = 1 into (B16):
m
2
[
k(1− θ) + βθ
m(1− θ) + β + 1
]
− β = 0. (B21)
The solution to (B21) is then easily derived:
θ∗ =
m(k − β +m)− 2β2
m(k − 3β +m) (B22)
If (B20) does not hold, then since θ∗ ≥ k/m implies θˆ2 = k/m, θ∗ is characterized
by substituting θˆ2 and ξ(θ) = (1− θ)/(1− k/m) into (B16):
m
2
(
k
m
+ 1
)
− 1− θ
1− k/mβ = 0. (B23)
The solution to (B23) is then easily derived:
θ∗ = 1− m(1− (k/m)
2)
2β
.
b. Suppose that k/m ≥ 1. From part (ii), m < β implies that A1 always keeps, so we
restrict attention to m ≥ β. We have σ(1) ≥ 0 and θˆ2 = ψ(θ) > θ for all θ ∈ [0, 1).
Thus, θˆ2 is interior for all values of θ and θ
∗ is characterized by the the value of θ
such that σ(θ) = 0, as given by (B22).
Observe finally that given θ∗, according to (B15) no type higher (resp., lower) than θ∗
can strictly benefit from keeping (resp., sharing); thus each type of A1 will play the specified
sharing strategy.
Summarizing all of the derivations yields the claimed result 
Proof of Comment B3
We show that the two possible values of θ∗ are increasing in β. Differentiating m(k−β+m)−2β
2
m(k−3β+m)
with respect to β yields the following condition:
2
(
3β2 + k(m− 2β) +m2 − 2βm)
m(k − 3β +m)2 > 0
⇔ (m− β)2 + 2β(β − k) + km > 0. (B24)
There are two possible subcases.
1. Suppose k < m. Expression (B24) is linear in k and holds at k = 0. At k = m, (B24)
evaluates to 2(m− β)2 + β2 > 0, which clearly holds. Thus (B24) holds for all k < m.
48
2. If k ≥ m, then it is sufficient to show that 2β(β − k) + km > 0. Observe that this
expression is linear in m, and for m = k, it evaluates to β2 + (β−k)2 > 0, which clearly
holds. As established in the proof of (iv) in Proposition B3, m ≥ β when k ≥ m, and
so the expression evaluates to 2β2 − kβ > 0 at m = β. This is true if k < 2β, which
follows from straightforward manipulation of the fact that β >
−m+
√
m2+8m(k+m)
4 in
any interior equilibrium. Next, differentiating 1 − m(1−(k/m)2)2β with respect to β yields
the following condition:
(1− k2/m2)m
2β2
> 0.
Since k/m < 1 for the subcase in which this value of θ∗ applies, this expression clearly
holds 
C Instructions
You are participating in a study on economic decision making and will be asked to make a
number of decisions. For your participation, you will receive a show-up fee of $5. Please read
these instructions carefully as they describe how you can earn additional money.
All the interaction between you and other participants will take place through the com-
puters. Please do not communicate with other participants. If you have a question, raise your
hand and one of us will help you.
The study is anonymous. In other words, your identity will not be revealed to others
and the identity of others will not be revealed to you.
During the study your earnings will be expressed in points. Points will be converted to
dollars at the following rate: 100 points = $10. You will be paid your earnings in cash.
The study is divided into 60 periods. At the end of the study, we will randomly select
one period (each with equal probability). Your earnings today will equal the number of
points you obtained in that randomly-selected period (plus the $5 show-up fee).
The decisions to be made in each period are described below.
Decisions in each period
In each period, you will interact with one other participant. Note that you will be randomly
paired with a different participant at the beginning of each period. Moreover, decisions
from past periods will not be revealed.
At the beginning of each period, both participants receive an endowment of 110 points.
In addition, each participant will be randomly assigned to a role and a productivity level.
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Specifically, one participant will be randomly assigned to the role of Player A and the other
participant to the role of Player B. The participant in the role of Player A will be randomly
assigned to a Low, Intermediate, or High productivity level (each being equally likely).
The participant in the role of Player B is always assigned to the High productivity level.
Each period is divided into two subsequent stages: a pre-investment stage, which is
then followed by an investment stage.
Pre-investment stage
In this stage, Player A receives an investment opportunity. Player A then decides whether
Player B can take part in the investment opportunity. Specifically, Player A chooses between
the following three options:
• Only A can invest
• Only B can invest
• Both A and B can invest
Investment stage
In this stage, players who can invest decide whether to invest or not invest. If a player does
not invest, he/she does not incur any costs and does not produce income. If a player invests,
he/she incurs a cost of 220 points and produces an amount of income that depends on the
player’s productivity according to Table I below.
Table I. Total income produced depending on productivity
Productivity of the investing player Total income produced
Low productivity 210 points
Intermediate productivity 285 points
High productivity 360 points
The total income produced is divided into two types of income and is distributed among
the two players in the following way:
• Constant income: this type of the income is always distributed equally between Player
A and Player B. Moreover, it is received irrespective of whether players could make an
investment decision or not, and if they could, irrespective of whether the players invested
or not.
• Varying income: this type of the income is distributed only among the players that
could make an investment decision. In other words:
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– If Player A chose “only A can invest” then Player A receives all the varying income.
– If Player A chose “only B can invest” then Player B receives all the varying income.
– If Player A chose “Both A and B can invest” then both players receive varying
income. The amount each player receives depends on the total amount of income
each player generates. Recall that a player generates income by investing; if he/she
does not invest then he/she generates 0 points. The precise share received by each
player is given by Table II.
Table II. Varying income if Player A chose “both A and B can invest”
Productivity of
Total income Share of varying
produced by income for
A B A B A B
Low High 210 points 360 points 30% 70%
Low High 210 points 0 points 78% 22%
Low High 0 points 360 points 3% 97%
Intermediate High 285 points 360 points 40% 60%
Intermediate High 285 points 0 points 88% 12%
Intermediate High 0 points 360 points 3% 97%
High High 360 points 360 points 50% 50%
High High 360 points 0 points 97% 3%
High High 0 points 360 points 3% 97%
To familiarize you with the screen in which you will make decisions, look at the provided
screenshot in which Player A makes the pre-investment choice. In this example, 50% of the
total income is allocated to constant income and the remaining 50% is allocated varying
income.
To help with the understanding of the way income and earnings are calculated, we will
walk you through the calculations seen in the screenshot. Note that while you are making
decisions these calculations are already made for you. We simply go through them here to
illustrate how they are done.
I. As you can see, irrespective of Player A’s pre-investment choice, if neither Player A nor
Player B invests then both players earn their endowment: 110 points.
II. If only A can invest and he/she does invest then:
• The earnings of Player A equal: A’s endowment (110 points) the cost of investing
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Screenshot of Player A’s pre-investment choice
(220 points) + A’s constant income (142 × 50% = 71 points) + all the varying
income (143 points) = 104 points.
• The earnings of Player B equal: B’s endowment (110 points) + B’s constant income
(142 × 50% = 71 points) = 181 points.
III. If only B can invest and he/she does invest then:
• The earnings of Player A equal: A’s endowment (110 points) + A’s constant income
(180 × 50% = 90 points) = 200 points.
• The earnings of Player B equal: B’s endowment (110 points) the cost of investing
(220 points) + B’s constant income (180 × 50% = 90 points) + all the varying
income (180 points) = 160 points.
• Note that, compared to case II, the constant and varying incomes are larger here
because Player B is the one who invests and Player B has a higher productivity
level than Player A.
IV. If both A and B can invest and both players invest then:
• The earnings of Player A equal: A’s endowment (110 points) the cost of investing
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(220 points) + A’s constant income (322 × 50% = 161 points) + A’s share of the
varying income (323 × 40% = 129 points) = 180 points.
• The earnings of Player B equal: B’s endowment (110 points) the cost of investing
(220 points) + B’s constant income (322 × 50% = 161 points) + B’s share of the
varying income (323 × 60% = 194 points) = 245 points.
• Note that when both players invest, the constant and varying incomes are largest
because both players generate income.
V. If both A and B can invest but only Player A invests then:
• The earnings of Player A equal: A’s endowment (110 points) the cost of investing
(220 points) + A’s constant income (142 × 50% = 71 points) + A’s share of the
varying income (143 × 88% = 125 points) = 86 points.
• The earnings of Player B equal: B’s endowment (110 points) + B’s constant income
(142 × 50% = 71 points) + B’s share of the varying income (143 × 12% = 18 points)
= 199 points.
• Note that, as in case II, in this case Player A is the only one generating the constant
and varying incomes. However, unlike in case II, Player A does not receive all the
varying income, which is why Player A’s earnings are lower and Player B’s earnings
are higher (compared to case II).
VI. If both A and B can invest but only Player B invests then:
• The earnings of Player A equal: A’s endowment (110 points) + A’s constant income
(180 × 50% = 90 points) + A’s share of the varying income (180 × 3% = 5 points)
= 205 points.
• The earnings of Player B equal: B’s endowment (110 points) the cost of investing
(220 points) + B’s constant income (180 × 50% = 90 points) + B’s share of the
varying income (180 × 97% = 175 points) = 155 points.
The precise division of total income into constant income and varying income will change
during the study. You will be told when such a change occurs.
This concludes the instructions. Please click on the red button on your screen. If you
have any questions then raise your hand and we will be happy to assist.
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D Statistical analysis
In this section we describe in detail the statistical analysis supporting the experimental results.
Regression analysis pooling on the theoretical predictions
Here we provide the regressions used to construct the 95% confidence intervals seen in Fig-
ure 3 in the main body of the paper. In all regressions, the only independent variables are
dummy variables indicating each of the predicted outcomes (collaboration being the omit-
ted outcome). Table D1 reports the marginal effects of the estimated coefficients and their
respective standard errors.D1 We cluster standard errors on the 24 matching groups.
Regression I in Table D1 corresponds to A1’s first stage choice. We estimate the coef-
ficients using a multinomial probit regression using A1’s choice to either keep (column Ia),
refer (column Ib), or share (column Ic) jurisdiction as the dependent variable. The next two
regressions correspond to probit regressions where the dependent variable equals one if A1
exerted effort in the second stage. Regression II restricts the sample to periods in which A1
decided to keep jurisdiction and regression III to periods in which A1 decided to share juris-
diction. Similarly, regressions IV and V correspond to probit regressions where the dependent
variable equals one if A2 exerted effort in the second stage. Regression IV restricts the sample
to periods in which A1 decided to refer jurisdiction and regression V to periods in which A1
decided to share jurisdiction. Finally, regression VI is an OLS regression estimating the effect
of the model’s predictions on total welfare as a fraction of the maximum welfare (i.e., the sum
of both players’ payoffs when both have a high productivity, jurisdiction, and exert effort:
W (θ1 + θ2)− 2k = 0.74).D2
The regressions from Table D1 can also be used to test whether there are statistically
significant differences in behavior between equilibrium predictions. Since we are making
multiple pairwise Wald tests for each variable, we determine statistical significance based
on Bonferroni-adjusted p-values. Specifically, for the jurisdiction decision, we multiply p-
values by 18 since we run one test per pairwise comparison for each of the three outcomes
(keep, refer, and share). For the effort choices, we multiply p-values by 12 since we run one
test per pairwise comparison for each jurisdiction choice (keep and share for A1, and refer
D1Marginal effects are estimated with respect to the case where all independent variables are zero. In other
words, they indicate the mean change in behavior compared to the collaboration outcome.
D2Results are vary similar if instead of the probit regressions we use logit regressions with subject fixed effects
and instead of an OLS we use a linear regression with subject fixed effects. The fixed-effects regressions are
available upon request.
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Table D1. Regressing equilibrium outcomes on observed behavior
Ia Ib Ic II III IV V VI
Indifference 0.00 0.12 −0.12 −0.87 −0.74 −0.83 −0.73 −0.70
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
Delegation −0.03 0.34 −0.31 −0.79 −0.95 −0.03 −0.07 −0.43
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Turf war 0.78 −0.01 −0.77 0.07 −0.01 0.03 0.01 −0.58
(0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
No. obs. 5760 643 4195 922 4195 5760
Note: Marginal effects and their respective standard errors in parenthesis.
and share for A2). Lastly, for welfare, we multiply p-values by 6 since we run one test per
pairwise comparison. The results of these pairwise comparisons are presented in Table D2.
The pairwise comparisons from the regressions give very similar results as those from
nonparametric tests (reported in Table 3 in the main body of the paper). There are only two
differences between these results and those from the nonparametric tests. First, A2s effort
after a referral is now significantly higher in a turf war compared to indifference, which is
consistent with the theoretical predictions. Second, the small difference in A2s effort rate
between delegation and turf war (6 percentage points) appears as statistically significant.
Statistical analysis of individual treatments
Here we provide the detailed statistical analysis of the subjects behavior in the individual
treatments. Figure 4 in the main body of the paper presents the mean actions taken by A1s
and A2s over all periods for each of the 12 combinations of β and θ1. Going from the top-
left to the bottom-right, the first three graphs show the mean fraction of times A1s choose
to keep, refer, or share jurisdiction. The next four graphs show the mean fraction of times
A1s/A2s exert effort (conditional on having jurisdiction, depending on whether they were
sharing jurisdiction or not. Lastly, the eighth graph shows mean total welfare as a fraction of
the maximum welfare.
To test whether the differences observed in Figure 3 are statistically significant, we ran
both regressions and nonparametric tests. We start with the nonparametric analysis. Once
again, we construct our independent observations by averaging the subjects’ behavior within
each matching group, which gives us 24 observations per treatment (all matching groups
experienced all the parameter combinations). We then performed all pairwise treatment com-
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Table D2. Pairwise comparisons between equilibrium predictions
Agent Action
Treatment comparisons
Indif. Indif. Indif. Deleg. Deleg. Collab.
vs. vs. vs. vs. vs. vs.
Deleg. Collab. Turf Collab. Turf Turf
A1
Keep ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
Refer ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
Share ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
Effort (after keep) ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
Effort (after share) ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
A2
Effort (after refer) ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
Effort (after share) ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
Both Welfare ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
Note: Pairwise comparisons between equilibrium predictions based on
the regressions in Table D1. ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical significance at
1% and 5% according to Bonferroni-adjusted p-values.
parisons using Wilcoxon-signed-rank tests. We use Bonferroni-adjusted p-values to avoid false
positives due to multiple comparisons. Specifically, for the jurisdiction choice, we multiply
p-values by 198 since we run one test for each of the 66 pairwise comparisons for each of the
three jurisdiction choices (i.e., for the keeping rate, the referral rate, and the sharing rate).
For A1’s effort rate, A2’s effort rate, and welfare, we we multiply p-values by 66 since we run
one test per pairwise comparison.D3
In Table D3 we present pairwise comparisons between treatments that have the same
productivity for A1. In other words, these tests allow us to observe one of the most interesting
predictions of the model, Namely, the non-monotonic effect of increasing the prize β at the
different productivity levels θ1 ∈ {0.55, 0.75, 0.95}. The other treatment comparisons are not
reproduced here but can be obtained by rerunning our statistical analysis using provided
do-file and dataset (we used the statistics software STATA version 13.1).
We start discussing the effort decision. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we
observe that increasing the prize clearly increases A2’s likelihood of exerting effort (when β
increases from 0.15 to 0.50) and A1’s likelihood of exerting effort when A1 is of intermediate
productivity (when β increases from 0.50 to 0.80) or high productivity (when β increases from
D3In this analysis, we do not separate the effort rate depending on the jurisdiction choice because, if we do,
there are too few independent observations for various treatment comparisons.
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Table D3. Treatments differences in behavior
Keep Refer Share
A1’s A2’s
Welfare
effort effort
θ55β15 vs. θ55β50 0.07
∗ −0.38∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.02 −0.73∗∗ −0.73∗∗
θ55β15 vs. θ55β80 0.06 −0.07 0.01 0.08∗ −0.81∗∗ −0.80∗∗
θ55β15 vs. θ55β95 −0.01 0.05 −0.04 0.07∗ −0.81∗∗ −0.73∗∗
θ55β50 vs. θ55β80 −0.01 0.31∗ −0.29∗ 0.06 −0.08∗ −0.07
θ55β50 vs. θ55β95 −0.08 0.43∗∗ −0.34∗∗ 0.05 −0.08 0.00
θ55β80 vs. θ55β95 −0.07 0.12 −0.05 −0.01 0.00 0.07
θ75β15 vs. θ75β50 0.04 −0.33∗∗ 0.29∗ 0.07 −0.69∗∗ −0.45∗∗
θ75β15 vs. θ75β80 −0.03 0.11 −0.08 −0.78∗∗ −0.79∗∗ −0.74∗∗
θ75β15 vs. θ75β95 −0.79∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.66∗∗ −0.84∗∗ −0.79∗∗ −0.24∗∗
θ75β50 vs. θ75β80 −0.07 0.44∗∗ −0.37∗∗ −0.85∗∗ −0.10∗ −0.29∗∗
θ75β50 vs. θ75β95 −0.83∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.37∗∗ −0.91∗∗ −0.10∗ 0.21∗∗
θ75β80 vs. θ75β95 −0.76∗∗ 0.02 0.74∗∗ −0.06∗ 0.00 0.50∗∗
θ95β15 vs. θ95β50 0.02 0.04 −0.07 −0.53∗∗ −0.59∗∗ −0.56∗∗
θ95β15 vs. θ95β80 −0.02 0.08∗ −0.07∗ −0.53∗∗ −0.63∗∗ −0.58∗∗
θ95β15 vs. θ95β95 −0.05 0.08∗ −0.04 −0.54∗∗ −0.63∗∗ −0.56∗∗
θ95β50 vs. θ95β80 −0.04 0.04 0.00 0.03 −0.04 −0.02
θ95β50 vs. θ95β95 −0.07 0.04 0.03 −0.01 −0.04 0.00
θ95β80 vs. θ95β95 −0.03 0.00 0.03 −0.01 0.00 0.02
Note: Mean differences in observed behavior between treatments. ∗∗ and
∗ indicate statistical significance at 1% and 5% according to Wilcoxon
signed-ranks tests using matching-group means and Bonferroni-adjusted
p-values.
0.15 to 0.50) but not when A1 is of low productivity. There are a few statistically significant
differences that are not inline with the theoretical predictions. However, they tend to be
small (at most 10 percentage points) and might occur because, as argued by Goeree and Holt
(2001), mistakes are bound to be made more often when they are less costly. In this case, not
exerting effort when one benefits from doing so is less costly for lower βs.
For the jurisdiction decision, we observe that, as predicted, increasing β to 0.95 strongly
increases the likelihood that A1 keeps jurisdiction when A1 is of intermediate productivity
but not when A1 is of low or high productivity. The most obvious deviation from the model’s
prediction is the high propensity of A1 of intermediate productivity to refer jurisdiction instead
of sharing it when β = 0.50. Once again, this can be explained by mistakes being made more
often when they are less costly (e.g., referring instead of sharing implies a loss of 2% of A1s
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Table D4. Regressing treatments on observed behavior
Ia Ib Ic II III IV
θ55β50 −0.07 0.38 −0.31 −0.02 0.73 0.37
(0.03) (0.18) (0.15) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
θ55β80 −0.06 0.07 −0.01 −0.08 0.81 0.40
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
θ55β95 0.01 −0.05 0.04 −0.07 0.80 0.37
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
θ75β15 −0.03 −0.04 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
θ75β50 −0.07 0.29 −0.22 0.00 0.73 0.38
(0.03) (0.15) (0.12) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01)
θ75β80 0.00 −0.15 0.15 0.85 0.83 0.60
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
θ75β95 0.76 −0.17 −0.59 0.90 0.84 0.24
(0.03) (0.11) (0.11) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
θ95β15 −0.03 −0.10 0.13 0.36 0.21 0.32
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
θ95β50 −0.06 −0.14 0.20 0.89 0.80 0.87
(0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
θ95β80 −0.02 −0.18 0.20 0.90 0.84 0.89
(0.03) (0.14) (0.12) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
θ95β95 0.01 −0.18 0.17 0.90 0.84 0.88
(0.02) (0.11) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
No. obs. 5760 4838 5117 5760
Note: Marginal effects and their respective standard er-
rors in parenthesis.
profits when β = 0.50 but a 9% of A1s profits when β = 0.80).
Lastly, we look at the treatment differences in welfare. In line with the theoretical predic-
tions, when A1 is of intermediate productivity welfare significantly increases as β increases
from 0.15 to 0.50 and then to 0.80, but then significantly decreases as β reaches 0.95. By
contrast, when A1 is of low or high productivity, welfare significantly increases as β increases
from 0.15 to 0.50 but then does not decrease with further increases in β.
We also analysed the data using regressions. In all regressions, the independent variables
correspond to dummy variables indicating each of the treatments (the omitted treatment is
θ55β15). We ran the same type of regressions as those reported in Table D1. Namely, regression
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Table D5. Pairwise comparisons between treatments
Keep Refer Share
A1’s A2’s
Welfare
effort effort
θ55β15 vs. θ55β50
∗∗ ∗∗
θ55β15 vs. θ55β80
∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
θ55β15 vs. θ55β95
∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
θ55β50 vs. θ55β80
∗∗
θ55β50 vs. θ55β95
∗
θ55β80 vs. θ55β95
θ75β15 vs. θ75β50
∗∗ ∗∗
θ75β15 vs. θ75β80
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
θ75β15 vs. θ75β95
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
θ75β50 vs. θ75β80
∗∗ ∗ ∗∗
θ75β50 vs. θ75β95
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
θ75β80 vs. θ75β95
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
θ95β15 vs. θ95β50
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
θ95β15 vs. θ95β80
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
θ95β15 vs. θ95β95
∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
θ95β50 vs. θ95β80
∗∗
θ95β50 vs. θ95β95
∗∗
θ95β80 vs. θ95β95
Note: Pairwise comparisons between treatments based on
the regressions in Table D4. ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistical
significance at 1% and 5% according to Bonferroni-adjusted
p-values.
I is a multinomial probit regression using A1’s choice to either keep (column Ia), refer (column
Ib), or share (column Ic) jurisdiction as the dependent variable. Regressions II and III are
probit regressions where the dependent variable is A1’s (regression II) or A2’s (regression III)
effort choice conditional on having jurisdiction. Lastly, regression IV is an OLS regression
with total welfare as a fraction of the maximum welfare as the dependent variable. Table D4
reports the marginal effects of the estimated coefficients and their respective standard errors.D4
Standard errors are clustered on the 24 matching groups.D5
D4As before, marginal effects are estimated for the case where all independent variables are zero.
D5Once again, the results are very similar if instead of the probit regressions we use logit regressions with
subject fixed effects and instead of an OLS we use a linear regression with subject fixed effects. These regressions
are available upon request.
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Using the regressions reported in Table D4, we use Wald tests to evaluate whether there are
statistically significant differences between treatments. To determine statistical significance,
we adjust p-values using the same method as in the nonparametric analysis. Table D5 presents
the significance of the same pairwise comparisons presented in Table D3.
By and large, the pairwise comparisons from the regressions give very similar results as
those from non-parametric tests (reported in Table D3). On one hand, a few of the small
treatment differences in the effort decision of A1 and A2 are now statistically significant at the
5% level. On the other hand, in the jurisdiction decision, the differences in the referral rate
that are statistically significant with the nonparametric tests are not statistically significant
with the regressions. However, both statistical approaches arrive to the same conclusion: A1’s
of intermediate productivity (but not A1’s of low or high productivity) keep jurisdiction more
when the prize is high, which produces an inverse U-shape relationship between the prize and
welfare.
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